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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the

charge of criminal mischief under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2)(c)?
Standard of Review: "The grant or denial fof a motion to dismiss is a question of
law [that] we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial
court.,n Salt Lake City v. Peterson, 2010 UT 64, f 6,k 245 P.2d 197 (citing State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 17, 70 P.3d 111).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the defendant's motion to dismiss
raised at the end of the plaintiffs case. See Record ("R") at 112, p. 384, line 8 - p. 388,
line 8.
2.

Was there sufficient evidence presented in the trial court to support the

jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of the charge of criminal mischief under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2)(c)?
Standard of Review:
When reviewing a challenge for sufficiency of the evidence,
we are 'highly deferential to a jury verdict,. . . and we will
reverse only when 'reasonable minds could not have reached
the verdict. Thus, we will reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds

1
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must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.
State v. Cly, 2007 UT App 212, f 15 (citations omitted).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the motion of defense counsel to
dismiss the charge made at the close of the plaintiffs case in chief. See R. at 112, p. 379,
line4-line 10.
3.

Did the trial court err in not declaring a mistrial after the defendant, at a

recess in the proceedings, was seen by a juror while the defendant was in handcuffs and
being escorted by a bailiff?
Standard of Review:
A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a
mistrial and its decision will remain undisturbed absent an
abuse of that discretion. A defendant has the burden of
persuading this court that the conduct complained of
prejudiced the outcome of the trial. In other words, unless a
review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly
wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the
defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, we will not
find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion.
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 20, 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (citations omitted).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the defendant's motion for a mistrial.
See R at 112, p. 271, line 12 - line 21.
4.

Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the defendant to use evidence of

past criminal convictions, currently pending criminal charges, and an existing ex parte
civil stalking injunction against one of the alleged victims in order to impeach the
2
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testimony of such alleged victim or to establish the existence of threatening behavior by
the alleged victim against the defendant and Ms. Quintero to prove that the alleged victim
had a motive for threatening the defendant, thereby supplying a basis for the defendant's
assertion of self defense?
Standard of Review: "Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.55 State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, J 11, 32 P.3d 976, 980.
"However, 'admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by
trial judges in the proper exercise of that discretion. '"Id. (citations omitted).
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. at 112, p. 191, line 13 - p. 213, line
5.
5.

Did the trial court err in overruling the objection of the defendant to Jury

Instruction Nos. 11 and 12, and in giving such jury instructions to the jury?
Standard of Review: "The standard of review for jury instructions to which
counsel has objected is correctness.55 State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (UT App 1998).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by defense counsel's objection to the
instruction. See R. at 112, p. 355, line 8 - p. 363, line 19.
6.

Was the defendant afforded effective assistance of counsel based upon his

attorneys5 failure to:
a.

Interview or subpoena witnesses identified by the defendant; and
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b.

Acquire copies of certain tape recordings of conversations between

the defendant and the alleged victim.
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d
162.
This issue was not raised in the trial court and is raised for the first time with this
appeal.
7.

Did the prosecution withhold certain tape recordings of conversations

between the defendant and the alleged victim which would have been exculpatory of or
beneficial to the defendant's defense, and thereby violate Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and defendant's due process rights?
Standard of Review: "But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor will not have
violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient
significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." United States v.
Agurs, All U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional
error has been committed. This means that the omission must
be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no
reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional
evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial.
On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable

I
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validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance
might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.
M a t 112-113.
The question as to what duty a prosecutor has to disclose
allegedly exculpatory evidence in a criminal case depends on
the nature of the evidence, whether the defense made a
specific request for the evidence, whether the evidence is
perjured, whether the defense knew, or, using reasonable
diligence, should have known, about the evidence, and, to a
certain extent, the conduct of the prosecution.
State v. Jarrell, 608 P. 2d 218, 223 - 224 (Utah 1980).
This issue was not raised in the trial court and is raised for the first time with this
appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103: Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined
in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a),
uses
(A) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or
(B) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-105: Transferred intent.
Where intentionally causing a result is an element of an offense, that element is
established even if a different person than the intended was killed, injured, or
harmed, or different property than the actor intended was damaged or otherwise
affected.

5
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-106(2)(ct): Criminal mischief.
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person:
(a) under the circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property
with the intention or defrauding an insurer;
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of anoth and as a result:
(i) recklessly endangers:
(A) human life; or
(B) human health or safety; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of
any critical infrastructures;
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or
(d) recklessly or wilfully shoots or propels a missile or another object at or against
a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose,
whether moving or standing.
Rule 16(a)(l-4) & (b)of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon
request the following material or information of which e has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorder statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offence for
reduced punishment; and....
(b) The prosecutor shall make disclosures as soon as practicable following the
filling of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor
has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Relevant evidence generally admissible;
irrelevant evidence inadmissable.
All relevant evidence is admissible, accept as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States of the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or
by other rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.
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Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds
of prejudice, confusion or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations or undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged
victim was the first aggressor;
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if
the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial.

Rule 607 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Who may impeach.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling the witness.

7
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Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Evidence of character and conduct of
witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form
of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness
for the purposes of attacking or supporting the witness5 character fro truthfulness,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or
(2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness
as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified....
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Impeachment by evidence of commitment of
crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice,
that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of
a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless
the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent
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to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest
the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that
person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult
and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is
admissible.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.

This case involves the appeal of certain rulings of the Fifth District Court, the
Honorable G. Rand Beacham, and a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of
aggravated assault, criminal mischief and reckless driving, and questioning whether
defendant was provided with effective assistance of counsel.
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II.

Course of Proceedings.

By the filing of an Information on March 31, 2009, the defendant was initially
charged with one count of aggravated assault, a 3rd degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-103; one count of criminal mischief, a 3rd degree felony, under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2)(c); one count of reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor,
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-528; and one count of leaving the scene of an accident, a
class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-401. A preliminary hearing was
scheduled for June 29, 2009. On that date an Amended Information was filed which
retained the original charges and charged the defendant with an additional count of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony. After the preliminary hearing, the defendant
was bound over and an arraignment was scheduled for July 2, 2009. At arraignment, the
defendant pled not guilty to all charges. A three day jury trial was scheduled to begin on
November 16, 2009. The jury trial was held as scheduled. The notice of appeal was filed
on December 22, 2009.
III.

Disposition at the Trial Court.

During trial, the defendant moved for a mistrial based upon the fact that the
defendant was seen in the hallway at the courthouse by a juror while the defendant was in
handcuffs. The trial court denied that motion. At the end of the plaintiffs case in chief,
the defendant moved to dismiss all charges as the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie
case. The trial court dismissed the charge of leaving the scene of an accident but allowed
10
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the remaining charges to go to the jury. The defendant objected to Jury Instruction Nos.
11 and 12 based upon such instructions containing the wrong mental state required for
finding the defendant guilty. However, the trial court overruled the defendant's
objection. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on one count of aggravated assault, the
count of criminal mischief, and the count of reckless driving. The defendant was found
not guilty of the remaining charge of aggravated assault.
On December 21, 2009, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison for the conviction of aggravated assault;
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison for the
conviction of criminal mischief; and a term of six months in the Washington County jail.
The defendant was given credit for time served. The prison term for aggravated assault
was ordered to run consecutive to the other terms of incarceration. The defendant was
also ordered to pay restitution.
IV.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

On March 30, 2009, the Washington City police department received a call
regarding a citizen dispute at a gas station in Washington City. (R. 112, p. 29o, line 20 p. 291, line 5). Shortly thereafter another call was received by the police department
regarding a traffic offense at the same location. (R. 112, p. 291, lines 8-11.) Officer
Christopher Ray, while responding to the first call, was advised to meet Anjelica Quintero
at her home. (R. 112, p. 292, line 24 - p. 293, line 2). Ms. Quintero was the defendant's
11
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girlfriend at the time. (R. 112, p. 339, lines 17 - 20). When Officer Ray met with the
defendant and Ms. Quintero, he was advised that the defendant and Ms. Quintero were
driving home and saw Michael Stevens' vehicle at the gas station. They became
concerned for their safety because Mr. Stevens had been recently threatening them. The
defendant and Ms. Quintero did not want Mr. Stevens to know where they lived. (R. 112,
p. 294, lines 2-18).
As the defendant and Ms. Quintero returned to their apartment complex, they
noticed Mr. Stevens parked on the corner by the complex. (R. 112, p. 295, lines 3-12).
Since the defendant and Ms. Quintero did not wish to have Mr. Stevens know where they
lived, they did not pull into their apartment complex. (R. 112, p. 295, lines 15-22).
According to the defendant's and Ms. Quintero's initial statements, they drove past Mr.
Stevens and continued back towards the gas station. After they passed Mr. Stevens, he
began to chase them in his vehicle. They entered the gas station and Mr. Stevens
continued to chase them around the pumps and to the backside of the building. (R. 112,
p. 295, line 19 - p. 296, line 14). Mr. Stevens then pulled his vehicle in front of the
defendant's and Ms. Quintero's vehicle, got out of the vehicle and approached the
defendant and Ms. Quintero in a very aggressive manner. The defendant and Ms.
Quintero could clearly see a black semi-automatic handgun in the front waistband of Mr.
Stevens' pants. (R. 112, p. 297, lines 1-14). After receiving this information from the
defendant and Ms. Quintero, Officer Ray went to the gas station to talk to Mr. Stevens,
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who had been found there by another Washington City officer. (R. 112, p. 298, lines 1723).
After arriving at the gas station, Officer Ray was able to view certain video
recordings from security cameras on the premises. The video showed that Mr. Stevens5
vehicle was actually being pursued by the vehicle driven by the defendant when it entered
the gas station. (R. 112, p. 301, lines 8-19). Both the defendant's and Mr. Stevens'
vehicles entered the gas station property and drove behind the building. The portion of
the gas station property behind the building could not be seen on the video recordings.
(R. 112, p. 306, lines 8-18). After approximately one and one-half minutes, the vehicle
operated by the defendant drove from the back of the gas station building and exited onto
the street. (R. 112, p. 308, lines 7-13).
Mr. Stevens' story as told to Officer Ray differed from that of the defendant and
Ms. Quintero. Mr. Stevens stated that he was sitting in his vehicle at the corner by the
defendant's and Ms. Quintero's apartment, that he had dropped his cell phone and when
he looked up, he saw Ms. Quintero and the defendant driving towards him. When Mr.
Stevens began to drive away, he noticed that the defendant and Ms. Quintero began to
follow him. He noticed that the defendant tried to pass his vehicle so Mr. Stevens sped
up. However, the defendant was still able to pass Mr. Stevens' vehicle and once the
defendant was in front of Mr. Stevens' vehicle, the defendant slammed on his brakes and
forced Mr. Stevens to stop. Once the vehicles were stopped, the defendant put his vehicle
13
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in reverse and tried to back up and hit Mr. Stevens5 vehicle. Mr. Stevens was able to
avoid being hit and drove to the gas station, with the defendant and Ms. Quintero
continuing to follow him. (R. 112, p. 309, line 13 - p. 310, line 16).
According to Mr. Stevens5 testimony, after the two vehicles went to the rear of the
gas station building, Mr. Stevens got out of his vehicle, put his hands up as if to ask
"What's going on?55 (R. 112, p. 183, lines 11-13). The defendant's vehicle came to a
stop approximately ten to fifteen away from Mr. Stevens, who was standing by a vehicle
hoist. The defendant then drove towards Mr. Stevens and collided with the hoist. (R.
112, p. 184, lines 2-24). The defendant then backed up his vehicle and proceeded to drive
down the street. (R. 112, p. 185, lines 17-20). Shortly thereafter, the defendant returned
to the gas station (R. 112, p. 238, lines 2-24) and, upon entering the gas station property,
drove his vehicle towards Mr. Stevens. Mr. Stevens was struck by the defendant's
vehicle. (R. 112, p. 242, lines 6-12).
The defendant claimed that his actions with regard to Mr. Stevens were based upon
the defendant's fear for his life due to previous threats by Mr. Stevens and the fact that
Mr. Stevens had a firearm. (R. 112, p. 315, lines 6-25). Based upon the investigation by
Officer Ray, Officer Ray arrested the defendant. Ms. Quintero testified at trial that her
prior statement given to Officer Ray, wherein she stated that Mr. Stevens was chasing
them and had a gun, was a lie, (R. 112, p. 342, line 20 - p. 343, line 15).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
At the end of the prosecution's case, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge of
criminal mischief based upon a lack of evidence that the defendant intentionally damaged
the car hoist. The plaintiff argued that where defendant intended to hit Mr. Stevens, but
missed, such intent should be transferred to the hoist and therefore defendant should be
found guilty. However, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-105, an intent to harm Mr. Stevens
could only be transferred to another person, not property. For this same reason, there was
insufficient evidence presented to support the jury's verdict of finding the defendant
guilty of criminal mischief.
During a brief recess in the trial, the defendant was seen by a juror in the hall while
the defendant was wearing handcuffs. Defendant asserts that this event prejudiced the
juror and the defendant moved for a mistrial. The court denied such motion after talking
to the juror. The defendant asserts that the prejudice caused by the juror seeing the
defendant in handcuffs could not be cured other than through a mistrial being declared.
The trial court should have allowed the defendant to use evidence of Mr. Stevens'
character, prior bad acts and the existence of an ex-parte civil stalking injunction obtained
by Ms. Quintero, to impeach Mr. Stevens' testimony and establish that the defendant
acted in self-defense. Such should have been allowed under the Rules of Evidence since
to do so would have established Mr. Stevens' character for violence under Rule 404(a)(2)
and a motive for the defendant's defense of himself as permitted by Rule 404(b).
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The defendant objected to Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 on the grounds that they
mis-stated the mental state required for the offense of aggravated assault. The defendant
asserts that the requisite mental state for finding a violation of the aggravated assault
statute is limited to intentional actions.
The defendant requested that his trial counsel interview and subpoena witnesses
identified by the defendant who could testify as to Mr. Stevens5 threats against the
defendant. However, trial counsel failed to do so. The defendant also requested that trial
counsel obtain copies of certain tape recordings in which Mr. Stevens threatened the
defendant. Counsel again failed to do so. Such omissions by trial counsel were
objectively deficient and but for such deficiencies, the defendant would have obtained a
more favorable outcome at trial.
Despite knowing of and having access to the tape recordings, and despite a request
for discovery from the defendant, the plaintiff failed to provide the defendant with copies
of the tape recordings. By failing to disclose the existence of the recordings or provide
copies of them, the plaintiff violated Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
and established case law requiring that all exculpatory and mitigating evidence be
provided to a defendant, even if not requested. Such failures violated the defendant's due
process rights.

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
In this appeal, counsel has determined that certain arguments of the defendant have
some merit and therefore a brief filed in accordance with State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168,
169-170 (Utah 1981) (following Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)), is not
appropriate. However, counsel does believe that certain of the defendant's arguments do
not raise meritorious claims. In order to meet counsel's obligation of effective
representation of the defendant, while complying with counsel's duties to this Court and
under the Code of Professional Conduct, counsel has separated those issues and
arguments which counsel believes raise meritorious claims and those claims which the
defendant wishes to have raised, under separate headings for the court's convenience.
Counsel has conferred with the defendant at length in order to adequately set forth the
defendant's claims.
L

The Defendant's Claims which Counsel Believes have Merit.
A.

The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss the charge of criminal mischief under Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-106(2¥c>?

Count 2 of the Information (Count 3 of the Amended Information), charged the
Defendant with criminal mischief, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann § 76-6106(2)(c). Under such section, a person commits criminal mischief if such person
"intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another." This charge was
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based upon the defendant's collision with the car hoist. However, no evidence was
presented by the plaintiff that the defendant "intentionally" damaged, defaced or
destroyed the hoist. The plaintiffs evidence was limited to the alleged fact that the
defendant attempted to hit Mr. Stevens with a vehicle and missed and hit the hoist. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant's intention of hitting Mr. Stevens was transferred to the
hoist and therefore the defendant was guilty of criminal mischief. See (R. 112, p. 384,
line 8 - p. 388, line 8, attached hereto as Addendum 1.)
The theory of transferred intent states that "Where intentionally causing a result is
an element of an offense, that element is established even if a different person than the
actor intended was killed, injured, or harmed, or different property than the actor intended
was damaged or otherwise affected." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-105. In this case there
was no evidence whatsoever that the defendant intended to damage any property
whatsoever. Thus, the theory of transferred intent does not apply. If the defendant had
intended to damage Mr. Stevens' vehicle but instead damaged the hoist, transferred intent
might be present. However, since, at best, the plaintiffs evidence could only show that
the defendant intended to harm Mr. Stevens and no other person was harmed, transferred
intent does not apply and the criminal mischief charge should have been dismissed. The
defendant did not have any intent to injure any property and therefore his intent could not
be transferred to the hoist.
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B.

There was insufficient evidence presented in the trial court to
support the jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of the
charge of criminal mischief under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6106QXc}?

Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2), for the defendant to be convicted of
criminal mischief, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant:
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or
destroys property with the intention of defrauding an insurer;
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of
another and as a result:
(i) recklessly endangers:
(A) human life; or
(B) human health or safety; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial
interruption or impairment of any critical
infrastructure;
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of
another; or
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other
object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat,
locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, whether moving or
standing.
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Additionally,
For the defendant to successfully challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence underlying his conviction, he must show 'when
viewing the evidence and all inferences that may reasonably
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury, reasonable minds could not believe him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.'

State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978) (citations omitted). In this case, the only
evidence presented was that the defendant attempted to run the vehicle the defendant was
driving into Mr. Stevens and inadvertently hit the hoist. As argued above, since the
defendant did not intend to damage any property by his actions, the elements required to
convict the defendant of criminal mischief were not established and the criminal mischief
charge should have been dismissed, even when the evidence and all inferences that may
reasonably be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury.
II.

The Claims Raised by the Defendant
A.

The trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after the
defendant at a recess in the proceedings, was seen by a juror
while the defendant was in handcuffs and being escorted by a
bailiff?

In this case, at a recess during the trial, one of the jurors saw the defendant in
handcuffs and being escorted by a bailiff. After this fact was made known to the trial
court judge, the judge interviewed the juror regarding the encounter and determined that
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

such encounter did not prejudice the juror's ability to fairly decide the case. (R. 112 at p.
270, line 12 - p. 282, line 22, attached hereto as Addendum 2). Defendant disputes that
the juror could not have been prejudiced by seeing the handcuffs on the defendant and
asserts that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial at that point.
A brief and fortuitous encounter of the defendant in handcuffs
is not prejudicial and requires an affirmative showing of
prejudice by the defendant.... The jury's inadvertent
observation of defendant outside the courtroom prior to trial
did not "dilute the presumption of innocence55 so as to require
a reversal absent evidence of actual prejudice.
State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993) (emphasis in original). The fact that the trial
judge interviewed the juror in a noninflammatory way and determined that the juror was
not prejudiced against the defendant would tend to cure any issue which might have been
raised by the juror briefly seeing the defendant in handcuffs. Further, there is a lack of
evidence in the record showing any actual prejudice.
B.

The trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to use
evidence of past criminal convictions, currently pending criminal
charges, and an existing ex parte civil stalking injunction against
one of the alleged victims in order to impeach the testimony of
such alleged victim or to establish the existence of threatening
behavior by the alleged victim against the defendant and Ms.
Quintero to prove that the alleged victim had a motive for
threatening the defendant thereby supplying a basis for the
defendant's assertion of self defense?

Under Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
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Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:

(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. — Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. — Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. -- Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown,
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial.
The courts have determined that
In deciding whether evidence of other bad acts is admissible
under Subdivision (b), the trial court must determine (1)
whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under this rule, (2) whether such evidence
meets the requirements of Rule 402, and (3) whether such
evidence meets the requirements of Rule 403.
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State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238,1J31, 32 P.3d 976, 986. This however does not end
the inquiry. "An erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not, however,
result in reversible error unless the error is harmful.... For an error to require reversal,
the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence
in the verdict." Id. at P38, 32 P.3d 988 (citations omitted).
Under Rule 607 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, "[t]he credibility of a witness may
be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness." Rule 608(a) provides
that
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.
Finally, under Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), "evidence that any witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment."
In this case, the defense sought to cross-examine Mr. Stevens regarding past
criminal convictions, currently pending criminal charges, and an existing ex parte civil
stalking injunction against Mr. Stevens in order to impeach Mr. Stevens5 testimony of the
events which led to the charges being filed against the defendant. Such evidence was also
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sought to establish the existence of threatening behavior by Mr. Stevens against the
defendant and Ms. Quintero to prove a motive for the defendant's assertion of self
defense. (R. at 112, p. 191, line 13 - p. 214, line 25, attached hereto as Addendum 3).
Based upon Rules 404, 608 and 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court refused
to allow defense counsel to inquire into Mr. Stevens' past criminal convictions, pending
criminal charges or the existence of the ex parte civil stalking injunction. By doing so,
the trial court prevented the defendant from seeking to discredit Mr. Stevens' testimony
based upon Mr. Stevens' prior obstruction of justice conviction or the prior threats made
by Mr. Stevens against the defendant and Ms. Quintero.
The emphasis of defendant's argument is that the trial court should have allowed
the attempted cross-examination to show that Mr. Stevens was biased in his testimony
since, as reflected in the written statements of the defendant and Ms. Quintero, the police
report of the incident, and the ex parte civil stalking injunction, Mr. Stevens had made
several threats against the defendant and Ms. Quintero causing them to fear for their
safety. Since the trial court found that the past convictions did not fall within the
requirements of admissibility under Rules 608 and 609 as bearing upon Mr. Stevens'
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and did not involve dishonesty or false
statements by Mr. Stevens, such evidence was not relevant or admissible. However, such
evidence would have established Mr. Stevens' character trait of violence under Rule
404(a)(2). Additionally/such evidence certainly would have established the motive of the
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defendant, as permitted by Rule 404(b) in seeking to defend himself from Mr. Stevens,
which was the claim of both the defendant and Ms. Quintero in their written statements.
If such evidence would have been allowed it is certainly probable that the jury could have
taken a different view of the defendant's claim that he was acting in self defense. Such
evidence was relevant under Rule 402 to the defendant's claim of self defense and would
not have resulted in unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury,
since an explanation for such evidence being used to prove motive could be easily
communicated to the jury. Based thereon, such evidence should have been allowed.
C.

The trial court erred in overruling the objection of the defendant
to Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12, and in giving such jury
instructions to the jury?

At the time of the offenses alleged against the defendant, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5103, provided that:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection (l)(a), uses
(A) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(B) other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
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The plaintiff proposed Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12, to which the defendant objected.
See R. 112, p. 355, line 8 - p. 364, line 3 and Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 (R. 76 and
77), attached hereto as Addendum 4. The basis of the objection was that such
instructions did not require a finding of intent but allowed conviction based upon intent,
knowledge or recklessness. The trial court ruled that since no mental state was specified
by the statute, and based upon the way the statute was written, intent was required as to §
76-5-103(l)(a) only, and an intentional, knowing or reckless state of mind was applicable
to § 76-5-103(l)(b). Since the theory and evidence of the plaintiffs case relied solely
upon § 76-5-103(l)(b), the issue is whether such section does apply an intentional,
knowing or reckless state of mind.
In In Re McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), under a version of § 76-5-103
similar to the statute existing on the date of the alleged offense in this case, the court
found that: "Under 76-5-103(1) (a) the prosecution must prove the defendant intentionally
caused serious bodily injury to another, but under 76-5-103(1) (b) no culpable mental
state is specified and thus under 76-2-102 "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall
suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Id. The application of a mental state based
upon intent, knowledge or recklessness with regard to charges under § 76-5-103(b) is
further bolstered by the fact that in 2010, the legislature revised § 76-5-103 to delete any
reference to "intent" as an element of the crime of aggravated assault. Based on the
above, the trial judge was likely correct in his ruling on the disputed jury instructions.
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D.

The defendant was not afforded effective assistance of counsel.

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show "(1) that
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists
that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable
outcome at trial." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, P6. Additionally,
To demonstrate objectively deficient performance under the
first part of the test, [the defendant] must overcome a strong
presumption that.. . trial counsel rendered adequate
assistance. (Citations omitted). In addition, we give trial
counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not
question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis
supporting them.
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (1996). Defendant asserts that trial counsel was
ineffective based upon counsels' failure to interview and subpoena certain witnesses and
failure to obtain certain tape recordings containing exculpatory evidence.
i.

Defense counsel failed to interview or subpoena witnesses
identified by the defendant

In this case, the defendant's main defense for his actions were based upon a claim
of self defense in that the defendant's actions against Mr. Stevens were based upon Mr.
Stevens' previous verbal threats and threatening actions against the defendant and Ms.
Quintero. However, other than referring to the written statements of the defendant and
Ms. Quintero regarding such threats and actions, defense counsel asserted no independent
evidence. In fact, in connection with the ex parte civil stalking injunction obtained by
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Ms. Quintero against Mr. Stevens, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 5, a
written statement was filed with the court asserting that Mr. Stevens had threatened the
defendant and Ms. Quintero. Additionally, other witnesses tot eh stalking were identified.
Despite the existence of such statement and identified witnesses, and the fact that
defendant had identified such witnesses to defense counsel, defense counsel did not
contact such witnesses, subpoena them, nor seek to introduce such evidence. Had defense
counsel done so, those witnesses could have established the prior threats and actions of
Mr. Stevens against the defendant and such evidence would have bolstered the
defendant's claim that he was acting in self defense in connection with his actions toward
Mr. Stevens. Such evidence could certainly have resulted in the jury giving more
credence to the defendant's self defense claim.
ii.

Defense counsel failed to acquire and offer into evidence
copies of certain tape recordings of conversations between
the defendant and the alleged victim.

The defendant, in preparing his defense, informed trial counsel of the existence of
certain tape recordings of conversations between Mr. Stevens and Ms. Quintero and the
defendant. Such recordings were allegedly made by law enforcement officials working
with Mr. Stevens in an attempt to obtain evidence against Ms. Quintero with regard to
certain drug allegations. In such conversations, Mr. Stevens allegedly threatens the
defendant. The plaintiff used an edited portion of such recordings during the defendant's
sentencing to show that the defendant threatened Mr. Stevens. Despite having been told
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of the existence of such recordings and their content, trial counsel did not obtain such
recordings nor evaluate the content thereof for exculpatory evidence or for evidence to
support the defendant's self defense claim.
Had trial counsel obtained and evaluated the recordings, and had the recordings
contained exculpatory evidence or evidence supporting defendant's self defense claim,
such evidence could have been presented to the jury to establish that Mr. Stevens had
threatened the defendant, that defendant feared for his life, and that the defendant was
acting in self defense with regard to Mr. Stevens. Therefore, the defendant was
prejudiced by trial counsels' failure to obtain the recordings.
E.

The prosecution willfully withheld certain tape recordings of
conversations between the defendant and the alleged victim
which would have been exculpatory of the defendant's actions or
beneficial to the defendant's defense?

As stated above, at sentencing in this matter, the plaintiff used an edited recording
of a conversation between the defendant and Mr. Stevens to show that the defendant had
threatened Mr. Stevens prior to the date of the incident which led to the criminal charges
against the defendant. The defendant had requested discovery from the plaintiff and
specifically requested any tape recorded statements or videotaped statements by the
defendant and any evidence that will tend to negate the guilt of the defendant. See R. at
15-16. Defendant had also requested supplemental discovery. The plaintiffs initial
discovery response indicated that any and all statements made by the defendant, whether
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written, recorded or oral, which were in the possession of the plaintiff were provided with
such response and indicated that the plaintiff was unaware of any information which
tended to negate, or mitigate, the guilt of the defendant, except as contained in the
documents provided with such response. See R. at 10-11. The plaintiff also supplemented
its discovery response, but the recordings at issue were not provided.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose
to the defense upon request the following material or
information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or
codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or
codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment;
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as
practicable following the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
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Additionally, in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court
noted that the defendant had demanded that all exculpatory and mitigating evidence be
provided by the State. The Court noted that
the prosecution had a duty to disclose such evidence. Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194
(1963); State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980); Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-16(a) (1982). Indeed, due process requires the
State to disclose even unrequested information which is or
may be exculpatory. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah
1985).
Id. at 849.
The question as to what duty a prosecutor has to disclose
allegedly exculpatory evidence in a criminal case depends on
the nature of the evidence, whether the defense made a
specific request for the evidence, whether the evidence is
perjured, whether the defense knew, or, using reasonable
diligence, should have known, about the evidence, and, to a
certain extent, the conduct of the prosecution. The underlying
concern is, of course, to make the judicial process a search for
truth and not just an arena of competition between the
prosecution and the defense.

Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have
dealt with the standards that should be applied in determining
whether evidence should have been disclosed by the
prosecution. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), the Court held that the
prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused, in the face of a specific request for the evidence,
violates due process if the evidence is material either to guilt
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or to punishment. Good faith of the prosecution in such an
instance is irrelevant... .
This Court has recognized that a deliberate suppression by the
prosecution of evidence which is material to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant in a criminal case is a denial of due
process. State v. Stewart, Utah, 544 P.2d 477 (1975); Butt v.
Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957).
State v. Jarrell, 608 P. 2d 218, 223 - 224 (Utah 1980).
While the defendant's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective based upon
such counsels' failure to obtain copies of the recordings at issue at defendant's request
may tend to negate the argument that the plaintiff failed to disclose and produce unknown
recordings, it goes without question that under the above cases, the plaintiff had a duty to
disclose the existence of the recordings and produce the recordings without the defendant
requesting the recordings. Most certainly, the plaintiff had a duty to disclose and produce
such recordings in response to the defendant's initial and supplemental discovery request,
even if the defendant did not specifically request such recordings, and based upon the
plaintiffs continuing duty of disclosure. The plaintiffs failure to disclose and produce
the recordings which contained exculpatory evidence violated the defendant's due process
rights and justifies granting the defendant relief from the jury verdict in this case and
ordering a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, the defendant respectfully request that this Court reverse
the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a mistrial and remand the case to the
trial court for a new trial. In the alternative, the judgment and verdict against the
defendant should be vacated based upon the failure to provide the defendant with
discovery in violation of the defendant's due process rights, failing to afford defendant
effective assistance of counsel, failing to allow the defendant to cross-examine Mr.
Stevens as desired, failing to properly instruct the jury with regard to the mental state
required for aggravated assault, and failing to dismiss the charge of criminal mischief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this<Sb day of June, 2011.

GanKr. Kuhlmann
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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eyewitness identification instruction.
MR. CRAMER: Okay. And, Your Honor, as

2

Mr. Stevens tried to hit him but never saw anything in

3

regards to Mr. Evans.

was said in My Cousin Vinny, we've given a good,

4

logical, reasonable argument; motion denied.

I think the officer's testimony was that

5

Mr. Cecil said that he saw Mr. Evans, that he may have

THE COURT: I remember that. All right.

6

been close to him but he didn't hit him. And I

Any other instructions we need to talk

7

believe that Mr. Evans' testimony was that in his

8 opinion, I heard him coming, I jumped back out of my

3bout?
MR. CRAMER: No other instructions from

9 way, he said, in fact he — I think his testimony was

us, Your Honor, and I believe that covers all of the

10 that I don't know that he would have even would have

State's proposed instructions, and I think we're set

11

on that.

12 and it (Inaudible) to that — actually, said that the
THE COURT: All right. I'll have them

hit me. And he was always — seemed — his testimony

13 way his eyes was fixed, that he always concentrated on

ready down to Number 17, then we'll have to talk about

14

self-defense instructions and the last two stock

15

Mr. Stevens.
So I would say, based upon that, that the

instructions and that we'll be able to do at 8:30

16

State has failed to meet its prima facie burden as

tomorrow.

17

regards to the Aggravated Assault that's alleged

18

against Mr. Evans.

I also — I think I gave you the verdict

MR. WEILAND: Your Honor — not meaning to

form, didn't I? There's nothing very interesting

19

about that.

20

interrupt. Oftentimes, rather than going through it,

And so, if there's nothing else, we —

21

could we just do it like charge by charge rather than

MR. CRAMER: Well, Your Honor, I think

22

going through all the arguments and then having me go

that we still need — Mr. Taylor needs to make his

23

all the way back and forgetting some? I mean, I don't

motion to dismiss on prima facie, and then we'll be

24

know if —

completed.

25

MR. TAYLOR: I don't have a problem if

378

380

MR. TAYLOR: That's correct.

1 that's what he wants to do.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead with that.

2

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor.

3

Like Mr. Cramer stated at the last one,

4

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WEILAND: I have a very short term
memory.

••
THE COURT: Go ahead then, Mr. Weiiand, on

I'll make a general motion to dismiss for the State

5

failure to meet its prima facie case regarding

6 the Count II, aggravated assault.

probable cause as to each of the counts, 1 through

7

MR. WEILAND: All right. Your Honor, with

five, and then I would just have some specific

8

regards to Count II, we believe that under 76-2-105,

arguments as to just a couple of the counts

9 which talks about transferred intent, that says where
10

intentionally causing a result is an element of the

THE COURT: Go ahead.

11

offense what — that element is established even if a

MR. TAYLOR: With the Court's ruling as in

12 different person other than the actor intended was

themselves.

regards to the Aggravated Assault with the reckless

13

being a part of the elements, and that, I would make

14

it as to Count II which is I believe the one that

15

relates to Mr. Evans if my memory serves me correctly.
The testimony, and that, that was given in
regards to Mr. Evans as it relates to the alleged

killed, injured or harmed.
And so we believe that under — if his
intent was to as the statute shows that his intent was

16 to hit Mr. Stevens and that he went directly after
17

him, if he -- if he — and because he was so close

18 there at the time that it caused fear and alarm in

assault: First of all, I don't believe there was any

19

Mr., you know, Evans, we. believe that also can be met

testimony by anybody that Mr. Cecil ever had any

20

with that same act.

intent whatsoever to hurt Mr. Evans. I don't believe

21

Mr. Evans said so, the officer, I don't believe there

22 the Defendant's own — the testimony is that the

was any testimony at all by Mr. Stevens that

23

I know that the evidence is — and even
officer asked him, he said, yes, he did have to jump

Mr. Stevens had — his testimony was that when they
24 out of the way.
came back into the parking lotDigitized
of thebyChevron,
that
he
25
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ras to kill — to get Mr. Stevens; however, by doing
o, he also caused an aggravated assault against

2
3

Ir. Evans because (Inaudible) right next to him and

4

oth of them (Inaudible) and he — all the — it's

5

ncontroverted evidence that he had to jump out of the

6

Well, okay, I think that's enough on that.

/ay to avoid being hit himself.

7

What's next?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

8

MR. WEILAND: And so we believe that there

9

; a prima facie case for that count under the

10

ransferred intent statute.

could conclude constituted an aggravated assault again
with the second element being added in.
So I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss
Count II with that record.

MR. TAYLOR: All right. Count III, I
believe, is the Criminal Mischief. This one here I
think that the State has failed to meet its burden of

11

proof even on a prima facie level even giving all

THE COURT: Okay.

12

inferences in favor of the State. In fact, I don't

Mr. Taylor?

13

think there are any inferences. I believe the State

14

has to prove even at prima facie level that he

hat, Your Honor, is that if he's going to argue

15

intentionally damaged, defaced or destroyed the

ransferred intent, then he can't be — either he has

16

property of the other, in this case the hoist or the

o argue specific intent and he was specifically

17

lift.

rying to hurt Mr. Evans or he has to argue general

18

ntent, that — in other words, he can't say that he

19

MR. TAYLOR: Our argument would be to

There's been no testimony whatsoever that
it was his intent to damage the lift. There has been

vas trying to -- either he has to say he specifically

20

testimony that he saw Mr. Stevens there and he was

rying to hurt Mr. Evans or he was specifically trying

21

trying to hit Mr. Stevens, but that's not having any

o hurt Mr. Stevens. He can't say that.

22

intent whatsoever to damage the lift.

(Discussion off the Record.)

23

MR. TAYLOR: He can't be arguing reckless

24

light most favorable to the State even with all of the

25

inferences found in their favor, I don't think there

vhen he's arguing on the specific — transferred

So I don't think that even viewed in the

384

382
1

are any inferences that he had any intent to damage

THE COURT: Yes.

2

that Chevron's lift. And I would ask that that one be

MR. TAYLOR: - there's no such thing as

3 dismissed.

ntent —

xansferred reckless.
THE COURT: Yes, I want to look at that
because I don't think that's... (Inaudible).
Well, I kind of go a different direction
A/ith respect to the charge of Aggravated Assault as to
Mr. Evans. I think the evidence which has been given

4

THE COURT: Mr. Weiland?

5

MR. WEILAND: And, Your Honor, I believe

6

there is a — a theory. And if I could, I would like

7

to draw the Court's attention with a picture, State's

8

Exhibit Number 2, specifically the photograph taken of

9

the lift and the area — we would argue that that

f it were taken by the jury in the light most

10

statute is a specific intent with the intent to

"avorable to the prosecution, it would be sufficient

11

destroy - damage the property of another.

for the jury to conclude that Mr. Cecil in using the

12

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

elements instruction, intentionally, knowingly or

13

MR. WEILAND: In that picture...

recklessly committed an act with unlawful force or

14

(Discussion off the Record.)

violence that caused or created a substantial risk of

15

MR. WEILAND: Mr. -- the facts of the case

bodily injury to Mr. Evans.

16

was that Mr. Stevens was behind that — I mean, if I

17

could, there was -- when asked — there was — does

necessarily — well, I guess, the jury could, again,

18

this accurately depict - he says, "Well, everything

if they took everything in the State's favor, conclude

19

but the police car was not there." He says, "The car

that Mr. Cecil intentionally attempted to do bodily

20

was not there." In fact, he was in front of the

injury.

21

police car. And if you look, there was a trailer

22

right there.

I don't know that the jury could

The threat — the threat element of it
doesn't really apply to the situation regarding

23

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

Mr. Evans. But I think more so committing an act with

24

MR. WEILAND: At that angle, he had to go

unlawful force or violence thatDigitized
can cause
or created
a Law25
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inSchool,
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o u p l e of pictures, the way the d a m a g e is done in the
r

2

I u n d e i s ta i i el 1 11 , \ c i I a i " I" s a i g 11 n i c: i 11 :::i m i cl I

ehicle on itself, it isn't — I m e a n , it's not ii)le

3

hadn't thought ' )f it that v a> , But I think it's

iff tl me side,,

4

certainly a reasonable argument to m a k e .

5

I would argue that that w a s his intent,

Ai id so I'll Ilea /e Count III in i. I'll : Jenny

lis intent was to get Mr. S t e v e n s a n d d e s t r o y a n y t h i n g

6

the motion to dismiss on that, leave C o u n t III in for

n its way to get it, and that's why he g u n n e d it and

"ii

t l ie purpose of letting the ji iry d e c i d e t h a t i s s u e •

t went so hard to cause that m u c h d a m a g e , the damage

8

a n o t h e r of intent. Interesting.

- f )int bumper. A n d I believe t h a t h e p u s h e d o n
:he gas in ai i effort to

9

Okay. Mr. 1 aylor?

10

he I lad tc destroy t h e

3roperty that was in the way to get at ! 1r. Stevens.

11

M R . T A YILO R i I h e o n II) ' :»t II i' EI r < i ni 11 I - J" c : 11 cl
argue based upon the State's argument just barely is

12

b a c k to the accident involving property d a m a g e . And

:ase based 01 IIle evidence that he did, in fact,

13

their argument is that he intentioi lalh damaged that

jestroy property of another based on — you know, the

il t

111 t till nei I I don't fhiinll* : that Count I

., A id sc I lb Eilie 'e tl r si e is a pi ii i 1a i ;'::: ::i s

can stand.

evidence that he revved his engines and gunned it and

15

T H E C O U R T : Let's (Inaudible)

l e w e n t fast.

16

MR. C R A M E R : -- based upon the idea - if
it was an accident, it's that argument we've been —

1he testimony is that there was
significant damage to that front b u m p e r . It's a 1976

18

3 M C which the testimony was with those massive steel

19

oumpers with all that darn lage. W e believe it was his

20

intent to destroy the property ii i the way to getting'

21

at t In, Stevens.

22

again i, i i ly a r g u m e n t is that I don't believe the

23

legislature intended to include accidei

I I IE C O I IIRT: O k a v
don't question that there
MR
i fas damage t I lis lb! ii i IJ: Eii i II: i it I do disp : ite tl lat tl lei e

2*1
25

T H E COUIR I : i e 5, tl ie ai gi mei it fir n the
prelim
M R . W EI LA, I J D: A n d!, i c 11 I Hi o i i : i",

i t: I i !: I i a I

I I
includes an intentional act. It's not just as we
388

386
was ever an\ evidence that was — can even allude that

often refer to as an accident, I believe that, you

it was his purpose to destroy or damag 2 til ril:: lid.

know, if you intentionalII\ c a u s e damage to another

Ih

testimony was, yes, he revved his engines and he sped

car, that it is your duty to stick around and give the

and he hit the lift, but the idea he was trying to run

s a i i i e i i i f c i i r 1 a t i c 1 11: h a t y o u n o r m a 11) N o u I cl

over Mr. Stevens,, that there was never a n \ testimon >

I don't believe that their intent

t h e r e f o r e ) ou don't need to stick around. I think

tried to damage that lift.

what they m e a n by accident is when two vehicles

Mr. Evans -- Mr. Stevens was behind the

collide or when there is a collision, you need to

lift and the lift may have been there, but there was
never — no testimony at all his purpose was to damage
tl LE rll lifll
I I Ill I

"as to,

all right, ii ') 01 1 intended: to cause the accident, then

whatsoever at least not that I heard that he purposely

: I,

,.

• 10 stick around and provide the s a m e information that you
1 1 1 lor malllhy i 'ould. A n d it's not broadened to say, oh, if
": ' : : )! 1 inter ided the act, ther 1 tl lerefore you'r e fi ee to

1 II tl i( ' ;t :JI :

interesting at guments. In 1 in > /ie " til 1 use are good
T H E C O U R T : So how do 1 kno\ « < 1 rhat the

a r g u m e n t s for the jury to hear. I think the d e f e n s e
has a perfectly credible, appropriate a r g u m e n t that
there wasn't any evidence of an intent to damage

1- 5
I:

legislature intended?
f 1R WEILA1 IE : :: ' - ell I 1 r : a n

II: :;: •

deface or destroy the property of another so the jur >

m e a n — m y questior1 is

could not find element two of Criminal Mischief.

by accident. I m e a n , did they — the definition of

Mr. Weiland has a good argument that the
ii itcnt was tc jar 1 iage tl iat |:; re pet 1: / so he ::e 1 11 Id get: to
the person behind it:

1 think both of those are

I don't know what they meant

"accident," does that include an intentional act that
caused — or does it just mean

r H IE C 01J R r: \ / e 11, 11 u s u a 11 > cl 0 e s 1 1'" t, cl 0 e s

arguable under the evidence that the jury has be- -

it? I m e a n , if s o m e o n e ' s c l i m b i n g

it

climbing to Angels Landing and j u m p s off eyes wide

And so I tl: link I need to gi\ e the instruction and

••• I

if s o m e o n e ' s

c
t - _.ry to decide w h e t h e r t h e y think there was
o p e n , we wouldn't call that an accident, we'd call it
sufficient evidence of intent rather
t
h
a
n
m
e
m
a
k
i
n
g
a J.suicide.
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T H E C O U R T : Yes. Do y o u think s h e did see
ecognize that he was in handcuffs?

^Luncn Kecess.)
T H E C O U R T : Retun ining to the record
ithout the m e m b e r s of the jury and without a

VOIC

osecutor for that matter.

ay she seen the back of him.

nere

\ , n don't

I IR: I' i L O R : I T ifit/'s Till right

9
10

IE C O U R T
V O I C E : ( audible) recognize that he
handcuffs
A V O I C E : I was right behind her and I saw
the door open and then step out, and like he said,

11

the door hadn't even closed and they backed out. A n d

13

she t h o u g h t an\, thing -- I don't e 'en I mow if she

•]

?e :l lrii li ri"].

(Discussion off the Record.)
T H IE C 01JIR I : 1 I 1 e I a s t j u r o i j i i s 1: a r i i v e d
i c !< s o \ ' e' re re a d) I: o lb i i i i g t I :i e ji i 11

:

ni it i i 11 i I e s s

ere's something we need to talk about.
MR. C R A M E R : Youi I \ Dnor there's a couple
things f r o m t h e Defense perspecti \ e. I think that
e r e was an inadvertent situation,
snsported all

jon't believe she would of —

I — from her impression of her leaving, I don't think

Inaudible)

recognized h i m as being the Defendar it or ai i

here a juror saw Mr. Ce nil in til le

than m e escoirtii ig the ji \r) ' out into the hallway.

ick being taken back to his cell. I believe he was

I HE COURT:

handcuffs, he i fas still ir i his courtroom clothes.

A VOICE:

Uh-huh.

But, again, that's

THE COURT: r>

T H E C O U R T : Yes. T h e officer mentioned

A VOICE: I can only speculate on what she

at to me. Again, \ Til yc u describe while ' /e're here
i the record where Mr. Cecil was when that juror came

thought.

ick.

THE COURT:
A VOICE: Yes, Judge. We were exiting out

22

is door after we had broke, and she was walking down

:\

e corner of the hall. It \ /as " 'ei > I )i net,

J"4

Tl IE DEFENDAf IT: I'm n : t si ire. I I :no ' she
saw m y hands behind me b a d : "I /I metll mer or not she saw
_ _ _

MR C R A M E R : Well, Your Honor, I think I
IOW what the Court will say, but I think the Court
:eds to understand where I'm coming from again. I
ways h a v e t o look a t these things from an appellate
igle as well as from a trial angle.
T H E C O U R T : Of course.
f IF! C R A M E R : '! r I .1 think that tltn case In - <
cleai that if something happens that gives a juror
impression that your client is in c u s t o d y , then
at gives them, kind of a prejudice against h i m that
ey feel: " W e l l , he's in custody, then he must be
ill s I ' )i ii ., '
I think the appropriate resolution would
to — I don't know whether you talk to a juror
out it, but we'd move for a mistrial o n those
ounds to preserve that argument,

272
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: I can't say.

out in the hall, the door hadn't evei i

T H E C O U R T : Okay.
W h a t do you think?

what do you think that

juror saw?

netal on my wrists or what, I don't know.

O n c e I recognized her, we were probably
27 0
mpletely closed. I just opened the door, brought
7i b a c k in a n d let her continue on down the hall.

i

3
4

T H E C O U R T : Was it a matter of maybe a
second or v a s it s e cenail seconds?

5
I

IE D E F E N D A N T : Yes, it was very brief, a
couple of s e c o n d s , m a y b e .

7

THE COURT: Yes.

c
9

W h e n you had Mr. Cecil c o m e back in t h e
courtroom, hov. I : .

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

A V O I C E : I just opened the door asked him
to step back inside. Put m y hand right on his
shoulder and said, "Step back inside."

17
18

hallway?

Well, Mr. Weiland, w h a t d o y o u t h i n k ?
MR. WEILAND: (Inaudible) probably get
more details f o r t h e r e c o r d . I m e a n , h o w wide is the

19

I IR

20
21

""' EILAir ID: P r :;! ' vith that door?

A V O I C E : Three and a half, four feet,
maybe.

22
MR. W E I L A N D : And with that door open
T H E C O U R T : f'es,
I IR. C R A ! 1'ER: Because 1 think flu it it could
23 would y o u say it's half the distance in the hallway?
ejudice him and she could very well go into
24
A V O I C E : Right (Inaudible).
liberations and say, "Well, I saw
himbyand
he w aW.
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A vi J i L t :

Yes,, we had exited the door, the

joor frame 01 i the other side of the door as it opens.

2

j u s t s p e c u l a t i o n for all of u s . If c o u l d v e r y < -ell!

3

h a v e a p p e a r e d to her like Mr. C e c i l \ / a s being directed

MR. WEILAND: And you were in the one half

:

it rolled by the office

:

* : u l d h a v e looked

of the hallway which you had a perfect view of the

5

I! i k e !: I I c i

11 ill 01 Il

6

Mr. Cecil a n d the j u r o r in the hall a n d m a y b e that was

8

i :>t t :» ha e h a p p e n , so he had Mr. Cecil go back ir it tl i:

9

r o o m s i n c e there's no place really for a j u r o r to go

A VOICE:

Yes.
W h e r e w a s Mr. S t e v e n s -- I'm

I In G E!' ::iiili Il
A VOICE:
I II

He

as right to the side of m e .

E l l AI Ji: :

II i igill ml

i I! in I I • it ia <

3 clear y 'iev ' of the jure " as ' iill:
A VOICE:

I'm sure he did. I didn't ask

WEILAND:

l o w long i

10

I mean, I -- and then -- and

e l l ' »f E : a i g :) s|i: call : tie: f Ills

"l! ill BI t ii

c h a m b e r s if y o u w a n t to?

13

I don't w a n t to -- y o u Iknov • b)

14

questioning, e m p h a s i z e s o m e t h i n g si le hasn't e v e n

15

tl i in! iglhf a b :>uit, But I suppose o n e approach would be to

;:, that —

just to say to her: "I understand that you and
Cecil happened to be p a s s i n g in the hall, was

Ma /be a max of two to three
seconds, It: was very

except dov m the hall.

11
12

iim if he had seen her.
MR

:: e r I s h o I d i n g t h e d : ' c i c p' 2 n a i ;:J s a i '

l o t — that's s o m e t h i n g I'd already instructed t h e m

I IIP: \ VEII ANE
5C i i :

Dffi

\ er\ t rief

As soor as

18

there a n y t h i n g a b o u t that, that c o n c e r n e d y o u ? "

•ecognized that it was the jury member, I turned him

19

d o n ' t knov ". T h a t m a y suggest to her that m a y b e she

around ( I n a u d i b l e ) .

20

missed s o m e t h i n g that she should h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d

I" 'ill : ' ' 'Ell

I ID:

i \> : I

I i- : n ) : >i i c I: ' 5

" : • : I til i 2 1

A VOICE:

She; I : ::ik:e :I

she was looking at

MIR : i R A J AE\< .:

23
24

ne.
MR. WEILAND:

about.

22

ury m e m b e r , w a s s h e looking at y o u r —

/ e l l i n icT it e j u >ll „

I k i: ni o ' ' t in c C : ' 111 t' s f: n : It: a II: I ^ a I n e?. :i) re a cl
instn ictions about not c o m m u n i c a t i n g or talking.

25

Yes.

I

T H E CO! IRT:

i es„
2:7(3

And did she - ' i /as there a n \ noticeable
expression on her face?
A

.

Id

I IR C R A M E R :

Just to a:^ oid the -

S o i i i e ty p :

Df

you

I ;: i : " ', y e s

4

c ould ask I ier in terms of that just sa> : "It is my

i i i a p p m o p r i a t e p e i c 2 |: 11 o n i,,

5

i understanding from the bailiffs that you weir e l e a \ ing

21 i e r a n y t h i n g went badly or not. Perhaps the C o u r t

N

MR. W E I L A N :

All right. And th

you

mmediately just put him back in?
A '(ZflCE: Yes;, I brought him back in here.
I IF!

1
2:

' H i Aj n: : j

nistrial. I don't think — at this — y o u k n o w , we
lave no information that the j u r o r even sav ' hiiin i, it's
'ery brief. T h e r e was a

6

- even kind of s o m e version

at the s a m e t i m e , sav v N Ii

Cecil in the hallway.

Can

you just tell me what your impression was?" Just ask

'OLJI ;! ibjie :t t :> a

I
9
10

her and open-ended question. And perhaps the Court
could just" do tl lat in c a m e r a with :)i it i is hei e bi it

itl i

the record going so that she wouldn't feel
THE COURT:

hat it was very brief, but he doesn't even know that

And the ont\ place tl lat I'd

12

have to do that is in the c o u r t r o o m h e r e b e c a u s e I

13

can't record in c h a m b e r s with court going o n o v e r

vould s a \ in i i ebuttal, briefly, is just that there

14

there.

eally is no

15

f IR. C R A M E R :

enforcement, although it's probably not physically

16

T H E COURT: Well, I might be able to,

)ossible for t

17

actually, by switching the c a m e r a in t h e r e , but t h e n

: sounds like t h e y w e r e f a c e to face. Still the fact

18

they w o u l d n ' t be getting a record of w h a t e v e r it is

3 he was being e s c o r t e d , his hands v ei e II: el lin ::! I mis

19

they're doing s o ,

>ackjf he w a s t a k e n b a c k by lav t e n f o r c e m e n t into t h e

20

lourtrc ::in i,

21

-he sa v' l'iii n.
Il IF ! CIR A M E R :

i c: nr I Ion : r the : i ih tl ling I

\ 'on k n o w , he's being escorted b) lav '

i on n kno

, iiit;"'s a n i n f e r e n c e t h a t he is in
Taylor wasn't there,

22

t's not like we were all walking out en mass as the

23

)«, tense t e a m .

24

MR. C R A M E R :
THE COURT:

O h , okay.

Okay.
What do you think

Mr. W e
I
m e a n — and I'll defer to the Court. I'm just — it's

?i
THE COURT: And how
might
it Howard
have appeared
~
you
know,
whenBYU.
you say, you know, "Don't think
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THE C O U R T : Y e s

2

caution, Your Honor.

MR. W E I L A N D : And that situation here
J S'I :: asking more into it: If she
bi it if there is
;
a (I n a u d i lb I e) :) f i i ; I" i"' : ir i o i t s } o u s a) , "' If I e ) , I

3
4
5

T H E C O U R T : — a s s u m i n g whatever it is s h e
saw or thought, or I don't know
t her experience is
and w h a t she might conclude.

understand that you saw Mr. Cecil in the hallway and

6
7

B u t I ill g ) a h :::a :! a n d ::!' :» 1:1 lat. I ::::t's
recess here and get set up. And then if you'll come
• •: i me 'c'll get: Ms Ml ::t i t o come in and speak to
me in just a m i n u t e .

to a oid the appearance : f iiri|: ' o| i<it: die: : :: j am it: t :»
tell us about it? Did you see anything?" I don't
know.

9
MR. C R A M E R : I think that would be

appropriate. I would ask the Court to do that again
just looking to complete a record.
THF: C O U R T ' :

10

11 tell the other jurors about her coming to talk to 11ie,
12

I II i-l lulh «' es, I would like to,

\ /ell
f 1R C R A M E R : A n d again i I'm

irlLh ::o JII isc::l!

Ilow, I'm going to have to tell her what to
Ill I \ oi il :! tell I EI is til lat as

ji ist t : t: fUll till v :::

13

:: 11 i e if j u r ::) if s a s s f i e

.: :» I e a fi n g, s I i e p a s s c :! II: >

14

somebody in the hallway. A n d I just wanted to know if

15

anything had been said - I d o n ' t e v e n want her

[ don't want it to be something that we flag her to:

Ill:)

I'll instruct her: ""Don't: tell anybody who it y /as

i/Vhy are they asking me that? So, if we could do it as

I

/ery low key.

18
19

pretty ' si i • t a id conscientious, and I think that
she'll do that.

sitting on the bench it's not going, to be able to be

20
21

MR. C R A M E R : That will be fine,
i our Hoi IOI , Thank you.

ow key just because of the natural authoritative

22

:: : sitioi i tl •: Court holds.

23
24

NIR. W E I L A N D : Your Honor. I'm just
(Inai idible) which juror — Ms. Allen?

25

T H E COURT: Ms. Allen (Inaudible).
280

THf". ::OUR I : i es.
1 1R. C R A M E R : I'm afrai :l

itl'i fill1 ,: Cc Litl:

THE COURT: (Inaudible) authority more
:han that.

at you passed." A n d I think, you know, she seems

T H E C O U R T : Okay.

278
I don't know what to tell y o u
MR. CRAMER: Is it ~ we don't have
:ourt reporters anymore.

1
2

[ IR. W E I L A N D : Do w e have two Ms. Allen's

3

THE COURT:

f IR FA i 'LOR: Is there any personal
•ecording device that could be used?

4

MR. W E I L A N D : O h , that's right, okay. I

THf" 001 IRT: Not realty I si ippost: je
:ould go into Judge Shumate's chaii nfaeirs if he's not ii i
here He's gc t: the stand alone thing.

6
7

THE CLERK: (Inaudible) idieo recorder?

5

8

fh:

e on! I nave : :>! ie left

know who you're talkii g alb :m it
T H E C O U R T : Yes, Ms. Allen with the dark
hair.
(Recess.)

9
10

1 I HE CO! JRT: A g a i n , reti irning to the record
A ' j 11! ! 1 I I o (; c I j r t < \ i t h M r C e c i I a n d C o u in s e I! f c if t h e

11
12

parties, i i :)t the members of the jur ) We couldn't
if i lake the recording equipment w o r k in J u d g e Shumate's

MR. CRAMK-R: ( J
k "!: til" ill : that -THE C O U R T : W e started it: and then -MR. C R A M E R : Just start it and have I teir

13
14
15

chambers. And so we just went into my chambers, the
Clerk, the Bailiff and I and were there, a n d ve
I jght Ms. Allen in a n d 1 said t o her — I c a n ' t s a y

16

it exactly, but I said that I had just h e a r d that s h e

I, IL w O U R l : (Inaudible) ask her to c o m e

17

I! lad inadvertently passed s o m e - passed Mr. Cecil ii i

18

the hallway, and I just wondered if there was anything

THE COURT: Yes, for video,, I v 'ouldn't
;ven necessarily w a n t her to know that it was being
•ecorded.

:ome in.
n.
MR

CRAMER: Just have the Court chat with

ler.
THE COURT: (Inaudible) in the chairs.

19

that concerned her about that. And she said — she

20

said, "No, the Bailiff h a d o p e n e d t h e Joor and I saw

21

him then i i and I j u s t put m y head dio\ -n and didn't make

MR. (IRA! HER: \ es.
22 any eye contact." A n d she
I said Was there
THE CO! IRT: 1 1a\ be v ie sh sulci qn > »itli that. 23 ait lything that concerned "y ou or did anybody say
think we better do that because I don't want
24 anything?" She said, "No. Not at all."
Inaudible)
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;ometmng or, you know, had a question about it

And

2

hen I asked if she had said anything to anybody on

3

he jury, and she said, "If k ,

-1

And tl ten I said,, "Well,

vhen you're going back, they may wanted to know why I

5

vas talking to , u so I'd like to have you just tell

6

hern that you inadvertently passed somebody involved

7

MR CR A M E R :
*

represented before she makes such a
decision
THE COURT: She needs to at least be
advised that she

n the case in the hallway and I just wanted to know
1111

"there had been anything said.
' E;! i : 11 o s c "":

" I i :• it

Oka\

z s t I i a I: s I i

E:

MR. CRAMER:

And I t ill ;ll

I 11 ::l p <E s s

E:

9

:i i 1 i 11 1 • 1

lallway. And she seemed very clear on that.

A n d t h a t ' s fine if that"s

wants to do. But I still think that she

She needs to be advised of

her rights and I think she needs an attorney because
hether :ne County decides to press charges or* not

11

now, I mean, that may be an issue later down the i oad.

So I think, at this point, I won't declare

12

I don't want to

1 mistrial. I think we're oka) on that score. And

13

THE COURT:

he didn't seem to be - she didn't seem to be

14

MR. \ 'EILAJ Jill : She's right uulLsi Jin.

:oncerned while she was saying she was not concerned,

15.

THE COURT

:

16

y o u understand what I mean. She didn't indicate

mything otherwise in her demeanor or tone of voice or

-

Let's bring herjn and see what her

MR. CRAMER:

MR. CRAMER: Okay. Fhank you, Your Honor.

19

MR. CRAMER: Thank you, Your Honor. No.
The only other record I would make is that
believe the State's next witness is Ms. Quintero.

We could grab maybe Mr. Terry

or somebody from next door and see

20

ited to make on that, let's do that.

Oka")

thinking is about that.

if 1 j tl nit ig at all.

THE COURT: Anything on the record you

\ Vhere is she?

1'HE COURT:

Let me ask: her if sh ;;•

ants

21

to. If she declines and she has ai i opportur lity, I

22

think that is her choice.

3

MR. CRAMER: Okay, thank you, Your Honor.

-•4

1y only concern 01

THE COURT: All t iigl it

hat's ) • 1

1 nail 1

ma'am?
282
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M R . I( A/EILAND: I'm sorr> N our Honor, I

1

'IS. QUINTERO: Anjelica Quintero.

MR CRAMER: If heir testimony is going to

MR. WEILAND: Your H o n o r -

>e such that: she is going to sa\ undiet oat! i til lat she

THE COURT:

ed on this witness statement form, tlleim I think she

4

I Is

jinttn 0

MR. WEILAND: I just wanted to be sure

eeds to be represented! and I doi i't want to be
bjecting in the middle of heir testimony and saying

6

he needs an attorney before she either perjures

1E •! 0 u R l : i e s

Je

" a i 11 10 i 11 a I :: e s u i c

you're recorded. Can you come up and take a seat on

erself here or admits to perjury by saying that this

8

the witness stand. You'll be up here soon,

; a lie.

9

apparent! > , I here's something that the attorneys have

THE COURT: Okay,

II)

i i Dtified n ic :>f that I need to ask ) ou about

MR. CRAMER:

I I

a g a i r i in 0'

So if that's going 1: :» be tl 11 :

ature of her testimony, I think she needs to be

MR. WEILAND:

III3

I IS. :;)! I l l ITER I): AnjeliCc 1 Qi tin it

/fiat do you know about that?
1 our Honor, I had spoken

nth her at length. I informed her that, you know,

I HE CO! J'Rl : An j "' :>u"re going t :» be called
I5
16

he could be looking at possible charges of the — you

/

F:
written statement to the police officers at an earlier
1jint back in March or early April, is that right?

now, writing a false report to police officers, a
iiass B Misdemeanor, and she goes "I don't care.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
I'm

THE COURT: And it's been suggested that

filling to testify truthfully ," and thai " what she
'ants to do.

»our testimony today might be different from what you
21

said in your written statement?

And so she has been advised. But she

THE WITNESS: \ es.

3\s, "I want to testify truthfully." And if you want
) bring her in and ask her certain questions yourself
len that's fine.

\ndl so

t: h a t / c u' re n e a r a m i cro p h 0 n e, \ / 0 u I d ": 01 ni

say your name again please?

^presented air id it need::', to be dc " '" n :) /,
THE COURT:

:

THE COURT: Is there a possibility of
hat?

THE Law
WITNESS:
Yes.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR,
may
contain
errors.
283

285

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

U.

Did you tell the officers everything

"uthfully the first time?
A.

Yes.

2

about it freely. We'll get you back in just a few

3

minutes.

4

(Jury Leaves.)

MR. WEILAND: Nothing further.

5

THE COURT: Okay. First of all,

THE COURT: You may cross-examine.

6

Mr. Taylor, tell me what it is you want to go into on

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you.

7

this line of questioning?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

8

Y MR. TAYLOR:

9

MR. TAYLOR: The only thing that I was
going to ask him was just simply the statement that he

Q.

Your full name is Michael Paul Stevens?

10

A.

Yes, it is.

11

mentioned that Anjelica Quintero — that he was out to

Q.

What is your date of birth?

12

get her for getting him arrested on a marijuana grow

A.

January 16, 1974.

13

up on Pine Valley Mountain, and that he has pending
charges —

made to Officer Ray in the police report where he had

Q.

So how old are you now?

14

A.

35.

15

THE COURT: What's the relevance of that?

Q.

35?

16

MR. TAYLOR: It goes to the statement that

How long did you date Anjelica, is it,

17

hasn't been into evidence yet, but Mr. Weiland alluded

uintero?

18

to it that Mr. Cecil and Anjelica Quintero had

A.

Anjelica.

19

contacted law enforcement regarding threats that had

Q.

Okay. How long did you date Anjelica?

20

been made to them by Mr. Stevens and this was

A.

For a few months starting in November.

21

Mr. Stevens' response to the officer as to why would

Q.

That would be November of 2008?

22

they — why would such a call have been made in the

A.

Yes.

23

first place to dispatch.

Q.

And about approximately what time did you

24

THE COURT: Yes. But I'm still wondering

25

— so, what is the relevance of that information even

:op dating her?

192

190
A.

January.

Q.

What type of a relationship did you have

ith her?
A.

We had, for the most part, an exclusive

1

if it is correct?

2

MR. TAYLOR: Well, the relevance is, is

3

that — our whole side of the story has to do with

4

this issue of self defense. If Mr. Stevens had made

5

threats to Mr. Cecil and Ms. Quintero, and that this

Q.

Did you ever get in arguments?

6

was the underlying reason regarding that Mr. Stevens

A.

No, not really.

7

was out to get Ms. Quintero for allegedly calling law

Q.

What caused you to stop seeing her?

8

enforcement in regards to a marijuana grow. It shows

A.

Just because I just didn't have an

9

bias for one thing, as to, you know, the statements

iterest in seeing her. She showed more her true

10

that he would make but also it's directly related to

)lors, and I didn't have an interest in that and I

11

who's chasing who. In other words, is there an issue

idn't want to be around it.

12

of self defense?

ilationship.

At some point in time on the day in

13

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

jestion here, on the 30th of March of this year, did

14

MR. TAYLOR: It gets to the underlying

)u make a statement to Officer Ray, who's right here,

15

reason why Mr. Cecil or Ms. Quintero would be alarmed

lat Anjelica thought that you were out to get her for

16

by Mr. Stevens' presence in the first place.

stting you arrested on a marijuana charge?

17

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Weiland?

18

MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, if the question

Q.

MR. WEILAND: Objection, Your Honor.
MR. TAYLOR: It's a statement made by a

19

is about regarding threats, he could ask specifically:

20

"Did you make any threats?" But I think it's improper

MR. WEILAND: May we approach?

21

to talk about — I mean, he can't be impeached on a

(Discussion off the Record.)

22

criminal matter that he hasn't even been prosecuted

THE COURT: Members of the jury, there's a

23

on. There's no conviction and so just bringing up —

24

alludes to this marijuana grow. I think it's

arty in interest in the matter.

jestion of evidence I've got to discuss with Counsel.

I have to excuse you to the jury
room,
I
25Library,
impermissible.
If he
wants
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regarding sometnmg mars rotany irrelevant, 1 tninK
3

it's improper.
THE COURT: Well, improper why?

4

MR. WEILAND: Well, number one, it's a
prior bad act and under Rule 60 — sorry.

5
6

THE COURT: Well, we're probably talking

statement/
MR. TAYLOR:

(Inaudible).

THE COURT: What did he say specifically
in his statement?
MR. TAYLOR: According to the officer, he

7

said that they had broken up a few weeks ago. He said

about 404B, "Where evidence of other crimes or wrongs

8

he was arrested recently for the marijuana grow in

or acts is admissible for purposes of proving motive"

9

Pine Valley. He said that for some reason Anjelica

10

thinks he's out to kill her for getting him arrested.

11

And then when he went on and said that Michael told

I would believe that it falls under any of those

12

him that he never made any threats to Anjelica or

categories.

13

(Inaudible) or Michael claimed he didn't know.

and other things.
MR. WEILAND: Right. And then what -- and

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Taylor is suggesting

14

MR. WEILAND: And so, if anything, he's

it — he's trying to show that this witness has a

15

saying to the officer he's never made any threats, and

motive to — to not tell the truth because he's been

16

now they want to bring in the fact that he thinks

accused of something by the people that were on the

17

Anjelica — he said that he thinks Anjelica is upset

other side of this dispute.

18

at the — I mean, I don't see how it comes in.

MR. WEILAND: Well, to not tell the truth

19

and that's why he's been chased off the side of the

20

road. I just don't see the connection.

THE COURT: Yes, I'm having real trouble
finding a straightforward analysis through that.

21

MR. TAYLOR: It also goes to the

22

(Inaudible) bias — if he has pending charges against

whether he even was chased off the side of the road.

23

him in the Fifth District Court and the State has

I mean, that's the Defense theory of it, so he wants

24

flown him down here from the State of Alaska, he has

to suggest a motive for the witness to not tell the

25

pending felony charges here, I think that there will

THE COURT: Not telling the truth about

194

196
always be (Inaudible) bias —

truth. Even if that's the case, though, Mr. Taylor, I

1

don't know why — I don't know why it would be

2

relevant what particular accusation had been made

3 felony charges?

against Mr. Stevens.

4

MR. TAYLOR: As far as — you mean the
marijuana grow itself?

5
6

THE COURT: What's the women's name? We
keep calling her 14 different versions.
MR. WEILAND: It's spelled Anjelica, but
it's Anjelica, and that's why I (Inaudible).

THE COURT: Does Mr. Stevens have pending
MR. TAYLOR: He does.
THE COURT: Okay. Is he presumed innocent
like Mr. Cecil?

7

MR. TAYLOR: Yes, he is.

8

THE COURT: Okay. So what can be said

9

about that, that's not unfairly prejudicial to a jury?

10

MR. TAYLOR: I think it goes to bias as to

THE COURT: Okay, so Anjelica?

11

whether or not the State has made any type of

MR. WEILAND: Yes.

12

agreement with him in regards to his case (Inaudible).

THE COURT: Quintero is that the last

13

name?

14

THE COURT: Well, that's not what you were
asking him about though.

MR. WEILAND: Yes.

15

THE COURT: What difference does it make

16

about that. But I would be eventually be asking him

what she might have accused Mr. Stevens of doing?

17

about that. I guess we just try to cover all of the

MR. TAYLOR: Well, maybe it goes to - it

18

bases now.

goes — I mean, it's Mr. Stevens' own statement in the

19

investigation of the matter (Inaudible) the officer

20

asked him, you know, "I received this call and they

21

said that you were making threats." Because the

22

officer is out looking for Mr. Stevens. Why — and

23

then he asked him why would — you know, "What's with

24

this?" And this is his reason for it.

25

MR. TAYLOR: Well, no, I'm asking him

Also I think under 6-13, prior statement
of the witness, could come in as well, I think.
THE COURT: For any purpose and any prior
statement?
MR. TAYLOR: Unless it's unduly
prejudicial under (Inaudible).
THE COURT: Well, all 613 says, though, is
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assumes tnat tnere'd De relevance behind the whole

2

discussion.

3

"Didn't you tell the officer that Anjelica had accused

4

you of committing some crime and you thought that she

5

was afraid you were trying to get revenge?" Or

6

something like that?

MR. TAYLOR: I think if Mr. Stevens -- he
can clarify and say, you know, he didn't say.
THE COURT: Well, let's go back to your

THE COURT: Can you just ask Mr. Stevens:

question, though, okay. What was it you were asking

7

MR. TAYLOR: I could certainly ask that.

Mr. Stevens when we got derailed?

8

However, I still think that it's admissible for me to

MR. TAYLOR: Well, I just asked him if he
made that statement to Officer Ray.
THE COURT: The statement that, "Anjelica
thinks I'm trying to get her"?
MR. TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

9

ask him whether or not he has any pending felony

10

charge here for the bias as to whether or not — you

11

know, is he receiving some benefit or motivation in

12

regards to this case that's somehow going to help him

13

in his pending felony matters in this very court.

THE COURT: Okay.

14

THE COURT: Well, I don't know the

MR. WEILAND: I mean -

15

THE COURT: That far--

16

charges, per se.
MR. TAYLOR:

MR. WEILAND: Well, I mean -

17

THE COURT: Well, as you know, charges per

THE COURT: To go that far or to ask the

(Inaudible).

18

se don't mean much of anything to me when I'm trying a

witness about his statements. We're not speculating

19

case. Why should I let you talk to the jury about

because apparently it's his written statement.

20

that?

MR. WEILAND: No, it's not his written

21

MR. TAYLOR: Well, I guess - it goes to

statement. You see, it's speculation. The officer

22

the bias, that he's able to work out a favorable plea

says, "Why you think Anjelica" — or "Why do you think

23

agreement or whatever he might be able to work out in

they're upset?" And he's speculating to the officer

24

his case.

why he thinks that — I mean.

25

THE COURT: You know, we can talk a long
200
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MR. TAYLOR: That's his opinion, though.

1
2

time about that.
MR. TAYLOR: And you can just say —

THE COURT: But if Mr. Stevens is required

3

either answer "yes" or "no".

THE COURT: Yes, that's true.

to testify and if he testifies consistently with his

4

written statement, he could be asked about that. And

5

all over the witness and come out with nothing except

if he had an opinion or some reason to have an

6

the black paint; or do you have any evidence that

opinion, he could express that same opinion, that he

7

there's any kind of plea agreement?

thinks that Anjelica — it gets too complicated when

8

MR. TAYLOR: I do not.

you say it that way.

9

THE COURT: Has there been anything

I guess, Mr. Taylor, what I'm trying to do
is find a way for this to be expressed that's not just
essentially mudslinging.
MR. TAYLOR: I'm not --

10
11
12

THE COURT: And slap a lot of black paint

offered to Mr. Stevens related to his case and
connected to his testimony in this case?
MR. WEILAND: There had been an offer but

13

it has been rejected and then I — we — I'm informed

14

last night — I mean, we could ask him out there:

charges, therefore the jury should conclude something

15

"Have there been any promises made to you regarding

or the other. And that's not what you're trying to

16

your other case?"

ask him about, and that's not what you're trying to

17

do. But I'm trying to find a way to express that

18

THE COURT: That he has his own criminal

isn't — to the jury, doesn't come out that way.
Can you think of some way to do that? I

19

THE WITNESS: No, I did reject the offer
that was proposed to my attorney.
MR. WEILAND: And then he wanted to handle

20

this case and then — get it over with before you made

nean, you're doing it by way of leading question,

21

any exception of any other offer and that was with

which is, of course, fine from your side of it, but if

22

Brenda Whiteley.

ihere's something in your leading question that is not

23

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

admissible or that is unfairly prejudicial, then I

24

MR. WEILAND: Has - and I guess I should

:an't let you use a leading question
that way.
25 have
asked,
been no promises made to him
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m t u j u K i : Yes.

2

know whether we'd know what crime of moral turpitude

Well, Mr. Taylor --

3

is, but how would those two be such that they would be

MR. WEILAND: I mean, I don't mind him

4

relevant to his credibility?

jsking: "Have there been any promises made to you for
'our testimony today?"
THE COURT: I'm not sure. That's a plain
r

anilla kind the question.

MR. TAYLOR: Well, on the - (Inaudible)

5
6

obstruction of justice, I guess, has to do with

7

dishonesty, with truth and veracity, I take it.
THE COURT: Do you know what the facts

8

MR. WEILAND: Well, (Inaudible).

9

THE COURT: (Inaudible) the question

10

hough of suggesting that the witness has criminal

11

harges against him still is one that I'm not very

12

appy with because charges are charges, not an apt

13

were?
MR. TAYLOR: I do not know what the facts
of the case were, just that he has the conviction.
THE COURT: Because obstruction of justice
might be someone at the door saying: Is so and so

xpression but charges are a dime a dozen, anybody can

14

home and the person saying, "No, he's not." You know.

ave charges. Mahatma Gandhi had charges, Jesus had

15

I suppose that's a lie. It's not a big thing in my

harges, you know, Martin Luther King had charges.

16

mind, but it is prosecutable.

MR. TAYLOR: I agree with Your Honor from
lat perspective.
THE COURT: And so the specifics of what

17

MR. TAYLOR:. The rule itself talks about

18 truth or — that sort of thing. It doesn't use the
19 words crime of moral turpitude, of course,
(Inaudible).

lose charges are, I think, goes too far and becomes

20

nfairly prejudicial because it just suggests to the

21

THE COURT: Were either of those felonies?

iry something that hasn't been proven, hasn't been

22

MR. TAYLOR: They are not.

5tablished and really may never be. But I — I think

23

THE COURT: Felonies.

nee there are charges pending, it would be fair for

24

Well, I'm kind of trying to go through the

\e witness to be asked if he has criminal charges

25

list, and think of good permissible ways for those to
204

202
be used, but I'm not coming up with it.

ending and if anybody's — if he's made a deal with

1

le Prosecution related to his testimony.

2

Okay. Under Rule 608: Credibility can be

MR. TAYLOR: That's fine.

3

attacked by specific instances of conduct. But that's

THE COURT: Now, you can ask that and

4

not really what you're talking about here. You're

lowing what the answer is going to be, I don't know

5 talking about just a charge.

at it helps, but that's kind of up to you. But I

6

ink to suggest that this is the nature of the

7

any motive to misrepresent. I would allow you to ask

larges and — I think that goes too far.

8

him about pending criminal charges and whether he's

9

made a deal for his testimony.

(Discussion off the Record.)
MR. TAYLOR: I should probably bring this
), too, as long as the jury is out.

10

The evidence qf bias, bias, prejudice or

MR. TAYLOR: So I could ask him whether he
has any pending criminal charges?
THE COURT: Is that objectionable?

THE COURT: Yes.

11
12

MR. TAYLOR: We do have a (Inaudible)

13

MR. WEILAND: I mean, again --

linion, a couple of prior convictions that have to do

14

THE COURT: I guess it does suggest more

th crimes of moral turpitude in our — the role that

15 than — yes. Maybe I just have to restrict it to

i are also going to question him about. Whether he

16

d a prior criminal history on two specific charges.

17 testimony to get any benefits. I just don't want

THE COURT: What are they?
MR. TAYLOR: One of them is attempted

asking him if he's made any agreements for his

18 to — you know, I just don't want to open a can that
19 has odor in it and has nothing else. There's no

struction of justice in 2005, and the other is

20

conviction, no evidence that could be given about this

:empted to sell or supply alcohol to minors in 2004.

21

specific charge. I'm not sure why this is so hard for

22

me this morning. I mean, I had a good breakfast, I
should be able to think through this.

peals has had all kinds of grief. In fact, I've

23
24

3rd it directed to the (Inaudible) opinion about the

25

Officer Ray. I mean, eventually, when we get to

THE COURT: Now, how would those be
missible because I know that they — the Court of

MR. TAYLOR: And this also relates to
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about the calls and that, that came in to him. I
mean, his investigation where he's deciding why

2
3

trial, I just don't see that as being anything other

Mr. Cecil and Ms. Quintero make a phone call to him

4

than just kind of a self-serving statement, I guess.

and tell him that they're fearing for their life if

5

Observations related to these crimes is what we really

there's absolutely no explanation that can be given.

6

ought to be focusing on.

I mean, Mr. Stevens gave his explanation as to why he

7

thought that was. He didn't say he did it, he just

8

not — I would allow you to ask the witness whether he

9

has made any agreements with the Prosecution or

said this is my explanation, this is what I

directly relates to the crime itself that we have for

Well, Mr. Taylor — I don't know, I'm just

10

understand.
she could testify -- they could ask her directly.

anybody else to testify in a particular way in order
11 to get an advantage in something he's interested in.
12 You could ask him whether he's made any threats.

They could also ask Ms. Stevens directly: Have you

13

made any threats?

14

MR. WEILAND: Ms. Quintero is here, and

What else is it that you really wanted to
know about?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

15

I'm still just struggling to find •

16 think I would ask him regarding this sort of thing is

MR. TAYLOR: The only other thing that I

probative value in that written statement of this

17

whether he's aware of the ex parte protective order,

witness that is greater than the prejudicial effect.

18

stalking injunction that was entered by Judge Shumate

I guess that's really what I'm struggling with, and

19

about four days after this occurred —

I'm just not finding it.

20

THE COURT: Well -

21

MR. TAYLOR: - in which he names

MR. TAYLOR: One other that I intended to
— you know, unless the Court has a problem with that,

22

Mr. Cecil as one of the protected persons; he was

with Mr. Evans, made this statement as well, that as

23

served with it.

far as his relationship with his stepbrother, the one

24

time stepbrother, that they had — they didn't have

25

THE COURT: But it was ex parte, no
hearing?

. .
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essentially much of a relationship because he thought

1

MR. TAYLOR: It just still says the

that he, once again, used drugs and there was a safety

2

ex parte order, so I'm assuming that there was not a

issue for his family. That's essentially his words

3

hearing, but he was served.

that's also in the statement.

4

THE COURT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. But how does that
relate to anything relevant to this case?
MR. TAYLOR: Well, part of our defense and

5

MR. TAYLOR: And it was signed.

6

MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, if they'd like

7

to open that up, that's fine because in that it was

8

filed after the fact, and I've already alleged to it.

eventually give a self defense instruction. And if

9

There was not any mention of any gun whatsoever.

he's made calls to law enforcement and said that

10

threats were made.

11
12

that.

13

evidence.

what we're looking at, of course, is the Court would

THE COURT: Now, who is it that "he"
you're talking about.
MR. TAYLOR: I'm talking about Mr. Cecil
and Ms. Quintero.

THE COURT: Yeah, you did, you did mention
MR. WEILAND: But I'm not offering it into

14

THE COURT:. U.h-huh.

15

MR. WEILAND: I'm just going address

THE COURT: Okay.

16

MR. TAYLOR: So that it gives some reason

Ms. Anjelica about it.

17

THE COURT: You see, that's the problem

then as well as, you know — you know an officer says

18

with the stalking injunction and the protective order

on the stand that Mr. Cecil and Ms. Quintero both told

19

procedure, particularly stalking injunctions because

law enforcement that they saw Mr. Stevens with a gun

20

if somebody is served with one of those, it still is a

in his waistband.

21

one-sided, unheard, untested allegation, and the party

22

who receives it may just ignore it. That doesn't mean

23
24

that anything has been proved.

THE COURT: Well, certainly they can
:estify about that. Reports of threats being made
still are marginally relevant at all. Again, anything

MR. TAYLOR: I wasn't going to ask him

25 about
it other
than
she
was aware that there was an
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asking if there are charges pending. If they haven't

z
3

been tried, if they haven't been heard by a Court,

4

THE COURT: Well, you could certainly ask

they're just charges, they're just allegations, and I

5

him if they had any kind of--what their relationship

i nc L U U K I : I nars aDour me same as

MK. IAYLOR: In other words, why he would
suspect him if he had any actual knowledge of —

just don't think that — I don't know, I just have a

6

was, and if his answer was, "It wasn't very close,"

problem with that as evidence because I think it

7

then the relevance of why it wasn't close goes into

suggests something to a jury who may — who would have

8

Mr. Evan's speculation mostly, unless you're going to

no reason to understand the stalking injunction or

9

have Mr. Evans testifying that Mr. Stevens came down

protective order process; it would suggest more to

10

to the shop and used drugs while he was watching, and

them than it really means.
Do you understand what I'm saying?

11

even that, I don't know how that's relevant to

12

anything that Mr. Stevens is saying today.

MR. TAYLOR: No, I understand where you're

13
14

coming from.
THE COURT: Ex parte stalking injunctions

MR. TAYLOR: Yes, I guess we just put our
objection on the record.

15

THE COURT: Yes, and I hope I'm not

only mean that somebody wrote up a good petition,

16

missing something here, but I'm just not finding that

that's all it means. The Judge doesn't weigh it, the

17

line through one of the rules that I'd like to in

Judge just says: It alleges enough; bingo, there's

18

order to let you question him about that.

your ex parte stalking injunction.

19

Then if we have a hearing, it may be a
whole different matter.
To me it's just the same as the pending

MR. TAYLOR: Just have to determine

20

whether or not Mr. Cecil testified or not (Inaudible)

21

somewhere so...

22

MR. WEILAND: If I understand correctly, I

criminal charges. It may well be the case, but I

23

take this also as a motion (Inaudible) the State that

don't see it has any particular relevance even to

24

there will be no mentioning of any arrest of

credibility unless you get evidence that there's been

25

Mr. Stevens regarding a marijuana grow in Pine Valley
212
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some kind of a deal made related to pending criminal

1

charges.

2

several months prior?
THE COURT: Yes, I don't see any relevance

3

to that in itself, and I see some clear danger of

problem with Mr. Evans testifying about what he stated

4

unfair prejudice, and so I don't think that could be

to the Officer about his relationship with his

5

asked about.

brother?

6

MR. TAYLOR: Sure. Did the Court have a

THE COURT: Tell me again what that was.
MR. TAYLOR: Essentially he told the
Officer that he didn't have much of a relationship

7

MR. WEILAND:. All right, thank you, Your
Honor.

8

(Discussion off the Record.)

9

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Taylor, anything

with his brother because of -- he said that he used

10

drugs and that (Inaudible) safety issue for his

11 back?

family, something to that effect.

12

THE COURT: I guess that would still be a

13

else we ought to be discussing before we get the jury
MR. TAYLOR: Not that I can think of.
I'll probably think of something (Inaudible).

question of what specifically it is that Mr. Evans

14

THE COURT: Yes, I know how that works.

knows as opposed to what he suspects, because if it

15

MR. WEILAND: I believe, from the State

was just suspicion, certainly he's entitled to act on

16

it but it's not — it wouldn't be relevant evidence.

17 stand.

I mean, I suspect lots of things in the

18

course of trials that, you know, aren't proved. I

19

just have to kind of push those aside.

20

MR. TAYLOR: Can I question him as to why
he made a statement as to detail?

(Inaudible) jury probably appreciated this time to
THE COURT: Probably so.
Do we need a break? Does anybody here
need to go out before we continue?

21
22

THE COURT: That--

23

MR. TAYLOR: Mr. Evans.

24

MR. WEILAND:, Your Honor, I just need to
talk to him briefly.
THE COURT: Okay. Let's take just five
minutes.

25
(Recess.)
THE COURT: As to why he made the
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vvt: d i e UCIUK on trie record witn parties,

ie witness, Counsel, not the members of the jury.
I went back to find my notes, and I

z

tnat rriena about, do you remember what you went to

3

see that friend about?

4

>uldn't remember which session it was/but I found it

5

om the District Court conference this year in May.

6

•ofessor Medwed from the University of Utah Law

7

A.

I went to see him to get $200 that he owed

Q.

Were you able to — was he able to make

me.
that payment to you or —

:hool did a discussion on Rule 608 and 609, and

8

A.

iafs where we are on this, and I think what I've

9

days.

mcluded, I'm satisfied with. There is one thing

10

iat I wanted to point out for Mr. Taylor on these ~

11

there are past convictions that Mr. Stevens has and

12

ey are not more than ten years' old and if a

13

mviction involves dishonesty or false statement,

14

en that is admissible and you may inquire on that.

15

The problem with just having the name of

16

Oh, no, he had avoided me for a couple of

Q.

Was he there?

A.

No, he wasn't. I talked to somebody that

was at his residence.
Q.

Do you know about how fast you were going

when you drove into the Chevron the second time?
A.

The second time I went into the gas

station?

e charge is that obstruction of justice might be

17

Q.

Uh-huh.

ssing a joint out the window of the car, which

18

A.

When I was being chased?

>esn't involve false statement. It might be: No,

19

Q.

I believe that was your testimony.

)Solutely not, I haven't seen him for years, and it's

20

A.

I wasn't paying attention to the speed.

>mebody who's hiding behind the couch. You know,

21

It was faster than I would have normally gone into the

at kind of thing, which would be a false statement.

22

station.

), if you know what that is and it is a dishonesty or

23

Ise statement that could be inquired into; if not, I

24

ouldn't be able to allow that.

25

Q.

Would you say that you were speeding?

A.

Well, I don't think the station parking

lot has a speed limit, but I definitely was going in a

214
MR. TAYLOR: (Inaudible) underlying impact

216
1

little quicker than if I was just going to get gas.
Q.

Have you had occasion to see the — hasn't

naudible) factual basis for that.

2

THE COURT: All right.

3

been introduced yet by the State — but have you seen

All right, have we got the jury back?

4

the video that the gas station made of the event?

MR. CRAMER: One more thing. We just

5

A.

No, I haven't.

anted to put on the record that both witnesses were

6

Q.

You've never seen that video? Okay.

here during this entire discussion because they are

7

ctims and they're allowed to be in the courtroom.

8

A.

Yes.

jt during this discussion of what is their testimony

9

Q.

And went around to the — around the back

at may be asked of them, they were here.
THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. Good point,

Did you drive between the diesel pumps?

10

side of the station, drove up alongside the hoist and

11

stopped?

12

A.

Yes.

All right. Let's get the jury back in.

13

Q.

That was your testimony.

(Discussion off the Record.)

14

(Jury Present.)

15

THE COURT: Please be seated.

16

A.

My guess was 10, 15 feet.

(Discussion off the Record.)

17

Q.

Okay. So he was just following right

THE COURT: We'll continue then with

18

>od point, thank you.

19

Dss-examination.
MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor.

20

Mr. Stevens, I believe that you testified

21

And how far would you say that Mr. Cecil
was behind you?

along just right behind you?
A.

Came up to a stop, 10, 15 feet behind my

vehicle.
Q.

You got out of your vehicle and was

standing by the hoist?

at you went to see a friend at the Adobe Ridge

22

rcle?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Now, did you just pull right up to the

A.

Yes.

Q.

Apartments there?

25

hoist and get out of the vehicle, get out of your
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2

intent in there is intentional. There's no knowing or

And so if you will come back tomorrow

3

reckless in it.

lorning at 9:00, we'll have those instructions all

4

*ady to go and we'll start reading them. And it will

5

possibilities: It's the causing bodily injury or

3ke us probably an hour to do the final jury

6

using a dangerous weapon.

rstructions and the closing arguments, and then it

7

MR. CRAMER: Correct.

rill be time for you to reach your decision.

8

THE COURT: Are they the same mens rea for

me.

Any questions?
Okay. With that, then, I'll excuse you

9

both of those?

10

or the evening. You can go out with the Bailiff and

11

'II see you tomorrow morning at 9:00. Thank you.

12

(Jury leaves.)

THE COURT: Now, there are two

13

MR. CRAMER: Well, we submit, Your Honor,
because — was it's all one statute.
Under circumstances not amounting to a
violation of 1(a) just means the serious bodily injury

14

isn't created, but that the person uses a dangerous

>f the jury have left. The door to the hallway is now

15

weapon or other such means or force likely to produce

:losed.

16

death or serious bodily injury.

THE COURT: Please be seated. The members

Let's go ahead with defense motions first.

17

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, don't know if the

18

MR. CRAMER: So really the only difference

19

there in Subsection b is, well, it didn't cause

Derspective to talk about jury instructions first

20

serious bodily injury but it was likely to. So the

Defore Mr. Taylor does his motion.

21

difference there is not really the mens rea, the

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me tell you

22

difference there is what happened for exactly the same

what I have then and we can work from that point.

23

purposes as we have here, and that's why it's charged

Let's see, I have most of the remaining instructions

24

as a third, because under Subsection 2, 1(a) is a

in order here. There are two Instruction Number 9's
354

25

Second Degree felony. Then, if a serious bodily

lourt wants — it seems for us logical from our

356

in any stock instructions as you're aware, and I would

1

injury happened, Subsection 3 1 B is a Third Degree

use the one that provides that the Defendant has the

2

Felony. The serious bodily injury didn't happen, but

absolute right under the Constitution to remain

3

I because it was likely to:

silent. That one's, obviously, the one that applies

4

THE COURT: Use of a dangerous weapon ~

here.

5

MR. CRAMER: Correct.

6

THE COURT: - or other means or force

Number 10 is the mens rea, definitions of
"intentional knowing and reckless."

7

Number 11 I have is the elements of

8

Aggravated Assault, and I've used the one that

9

likely to produce.
MR. CRAMER: Right. Now, the dangerous
weapon statute, I think — as an and aside — is

10

Constitutionally vague. But in this search for the

11
12

circumstance, a vehicle can clearly be considered one.
So I'm not going to argue that.

13

THE COURT: Mr. Weiland had that defined

14

as any item capable of causing death or serious bodily

Aggravated Assault as laid out in the statute of

15

injury —

76-5-103 is a specific intent crime, that it has to be

16

intentional.

17

Mr. Weiland prepared and just put a number on it.
MR. CRAMER: And that's the one we have
the question on, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CRAMER: It seems to us that

76 5-103 (1), person commits Aggravated

18

Assault as defined in 102, which is the definition of

19

"assault."

20

MR. CRAMER: And that's true, Your Honor,
that THE COURT:. ->-. and then had the facsimile
part, which is not something we need.
MR. CRAMER: Right. And I think for this

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

21

case that would be well. Realistically, an envelope

MR. CRAMER: And he intentionally causes

22

could meet that definition if it had anthrax in it.

serious bodily to another or under circumstances not

23
24

THE COURT: Right.
MR. CRAMER: So that's just an aside.

amounting to a violation of Subsection 1(a) uses a

25
I think
that the
dangerous weapon or other means
likely
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can't be knowing —
THE COURT: Now, on every element of it or
on the use of a dangerous weapon?
MR. CRAMER: I think - I think on A under

2
3

that statute.

4

THE COURT: Uh-huh, correct.

5

All right. On that one point,

the jury instruction — I think that B and C, there's

6

a difference there, and Ithink that's the problem

7

we're having. I think it's intentional. It's a

8
9

specific intent all the way through.

assault as opposed to the mental intention here within

Mr. Wei land, what's your, response?
MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, my argument is
that — as to 1(a), there is a specific intent
(Inaudible) intentionally. And the State legislators

10

specifically did not include any mental element as to

here, one that allows knowingly, intentional, reckless

11

1 B, and that's for — that's why you have the fall

or this one under which he's charged which requires

12 back position of 76-2 102 which says that and when a

intentional.

13

But we've got two statutes that are mixed

So I think that this would have to be

definition of the offense is not specific, does not

14 specify of a culpable mental offense and that offense

rewritten to mirror 76 5-103, and the Jury Instruction

15

is not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge or

should only include language of intentional.

16

recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal

17

responsibility.

I think it's like the aggravated — or the

We believe that the State Legislature was

attempted murder statute. It's a specific intent

18

crime, and that's what you have to prove.

19

clear in that Count I A does include intentionally,

THE COURT: Oh, but 103 incorporates the

20

and that's why also the violation — I'm now reading

definition of "assault," and then adds A and B as the

21

off Subpart 2. It's a violation of subsection 1(a) is

aggravated parts. So we'd have to have a normal

22

a Second Degree felony because it does require that

definition of an assault.

23

enhanced, strict — or I mean the enhanced mental

24

element.

MR. CRAMER: Okay.
THE COURT: Or otherwise the jury would

25

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
360
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just be left to ponder what assault really means.

1

MR. WEILAND: But when - and then it

MR. CRAMER: I understand, but -

2

says, "One — under Subsection 3, violates subsection

THE COURT: So that's Mr. Weiland's

3

1 B is a Third Degree Felony. And I believe that they

4

— the State legislature reviewed that and says that

MR. CRAMER: Okay.

5

they do have the specific intent to cause serious

THE COURT: But then the element number

6

bodily injury to another, then it is a further

two, I do understand, I think, you're argument that

7

enhanced or there is a — I call it as general intent

that's an intentional rather than any one of the

8

include recklessness while under Subsection 1 B, and

three.

9

that's why it's only a Third Degree Felony.

element number one.

Now, wherever it is, the statute also

10

If Counsel is saying it's the same mental

provides that if the mental state is not specified,

11

intent for both, then my argument would be that it all

then it can be any one of —

12

— the entire statute should be a second agree felony,

MR. CRAMER: That's correct.

13

and not — but since they differentiated it, they

MR. WEILAND: 76-2-102, Your Honor.

14

wanted to — they meant to include, and they

THE COURT: Yeah, okay.

15

specifically did not include a mental state, and

MR. CRAMER: That's correct. And I

16

that's why we need to go to the fall back of 76 2-102.

stipulate to that, Your Honor. But this statute, 76

17

THE COURT: All right. Okay.

5-103, has a specific intent element in it.

18

MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, in rebuttal, I

THE COURT: It does as to 1(a), certainly.

19

would only submit that the only difference between

MR. CRAMER: Well - and I think it does

20

1(a) and one B is that in 1(a) someone did have

as to 1 B, as well, Your Honor, unless the Court's

21

serious bodily injury, and that's what makes it a
second degree felony, not the mental intent.

going with under circumstances not amounting to a

22

violation of subsection 1(a), and those circumstances

23

In 1 B, there was no serious bodily injury

being a different mental intent, a different mens rea.

24

but could have been, and therefore that's why it's a

25 third,
But I really don't think it is.Digitized
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2

Aggravated Assault instructions that Mr. Weiland

written it differently, that you had to have a

3

prepared.

Decific mental intent for both elements.

4

MR. CRAMER: Otherwise, they would have

13 is the definitions, act, bodily injury

5

and dangerous weapon, but I would eliminate the B part

lat was their true intentions, they would have a

6

of dangerous weapon and just include the any item

erson — well, after the — a person commits

7

capable part because it is not a facsimile (Inaudible)

ggravated Assault if he commits assault as defined

8

we're looking at here.

nd he intentionally semicolon — or colon —
THE COURT: Yes.

9

MR. WEILAND: Brief response to that: If

Now, on the Criminal Mischief element,

10 there was something that — oh, I recall what it was,

MR. WEILAND: -- and so that's why it does

11

and we had this in a trial not long ago involving

ot include both. But they separated it, and they put

12

another charge of Criminal Mischief.

he specific mental element in 1(a) and not 1 B.

13

And then is the question whether the value

14

of the property is something that the jury is to

inalysis. And that's the way I would read it

15

decide. If they are, we need a special verdict for

>bjectively.

16 that because otherwise we don't know what the jury

THE COURT: Yes, I understand that

Now, if intentionally were meant to

17 decided.

qualify both A and B, then it would either be stated

18

n both A and B or it would be put before the colon

19

need to decide the value of the property with at least

So, if we tell the jury that it's - they

3nd before A and B.

20

a thousand dollars and less than $5,000, then that

21

needs to be in the verdict form as part of the special

ntent is from the way they constructed the statute

22

verdict.

tself, and I think that's correct.

23

The only way I can divine legislative

Now, that being said, Mr. Weiland, are you
going to be arguing that Mr. Cecil recklessly used a

It can be done. It's just that it's a

24

little more complicated than a normal guilty or not

25

guilty verdict.
364
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1

vehicle or —

Is that what you were thinking of doing

MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, in light --

2

THE COURT: - willingly or intentionally.

3

with that element?

MR. WEILAND: Yes, I'm going to argue all

4

we eliminated that element, but I think it was because

three. I mean, with the arguments from counsel that

5

the defense in that case stipulated that if there was

I'll - during cross-examination, well, isn't it true

6

damaged caused, it was at least a thousand. And, in

that he — you know, you were standing in the way? I

7

fact, I think in that case it was more than 5,000, but

mean, I believe the evidence is different, but I would

8

the Prosecution had charged it as a Third Degree

like to leave that open to, you know, be able to argue

9 Felony.

And let me tell.you: In the other trial,

10

Was that your case?

THE COURT: Yes.

11

MR. WEILAND: That was my case,

Well, okay, with that record, I'm going to

12 Your Honor.

that that was his intent.

consider it as an objection to instruction 11, and

13

THE COURT: Okay. Which case was that?

overrule the objection. I'll give element two the way

14

MR. WEILAND: That was State v. Stevens.

it is written there, because that is the way that I

15

MR. CRAMER: That's correct, Your Honor.

would understand the statute even though it's a bit

16 That's the one we did three weeks ago.

incomplete to state intentionally in one part of it

17

and then just state nothing in another part. But I

18

think that's the way I would understand that.
All right. Other any other points on
these elements ~

19
20

THE COURT: Okay. That's right. That's
right okay.
MR. WEILAND: So, I mean - what I recall
is that we also just left that element in, that it was

21 just a — one of the final elements and they must
22

prove that it was a — and then what we did was —

would just go through with the rest of the

23

(Inaudible).

instructions, and if we have objections, we'll make

24

MR. CRAMER: No, Your Honor. If the Court

them.

MR. CRAMER: (Inaudible).

MR.Law
WEILAND:
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INSTRUCTION NO. W

The following are the elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault, as charged in Count 1:
1.

2.

The defendant:
a.

intentionally attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another, to wit: Michael Stevens; or

b.

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly threatened, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or

c.

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly committed an act, with unlawful force or
violence, that caused or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another; and

The defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly used a dangerous weapon

If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, element la, lb or Ic, and
element 2, you must find the defendant guilty of the crime of Aggravated Assault.

If you do not find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, element la, lb or lc,
and element 2, you must find the defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO. !$L

The following are the elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault, as charged in Count 2:
1.

The defendant:
a. intentionally attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another, to wit: Todd Evans; or
b. intentionally, knowingly or recklessly threatened, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
c. intentionally, knowingly or recklessly committed an act, with unlawful force or
violence, that caused or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another; and

2.

The defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly used a dangerous weapon

If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, element la, lb or lc, and
element 2, you must find the defendant guilty of the crime of Aggravated Assault.
If you do not find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, element la, lb or lc,
and element 2, you must find the defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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&

Request for Civil
Stalking Injunction
1

(pase Number.

:

:'tnSl«lCf COUif!

ftffi(ffiftf>bffi

l | Q6.

(pourt: Washington^&mifrtyMH
WMffi
cjounty: Washington State: tftorA

ill

Petitioner (person needing protection):

3&cU^Ux^t^<
Angelica Quintero
First

Middle

Last

Address and phone # (to keep private*, leave blapk);
258 South 200 West #4

]

435-229-3791
435-652-3124 (Work)
Name and phone number of Petitioner's attorney (\
feny):

2

Respondent (person you need to be protectedtyomj.

Mike Stevens
First

Middle

/.as/

Odier names used: Ryder

Address;
5424 ,Sw///? River Road #G-6
Bloomington Hills, Utah 84790

*
j
!

A judge can grant a stalking injunction 0/1/y if theResnondent did th«e 3 things:
(1) The Respondent stalked you specifically, two qr pore times. ''Stalked" means the Respondent stayed physically or
visually close to you, made verbal or written) threats to you,'Si-rp3 something that was threatening.'
(2) The Respondent knew or should have lcnow^thaj the stalking Wild cause you to fear that you or a family member
could be physically hurt or emotionally cUstij^efl, or that a reasonable person would be afraid of being physically
hurt or emotionally distressed, and
. -:
(3) The "Respondent's stalking actually made yoq qr:fen immediate Jjamily member emotionally distressed or fearful that
you would be hurt. An "immediate family mcn}bjar" means your, spouse, child, sibling, or any other person who
lives with you now, or who lived with you witlyH| the past 6 ninths.
Note! In addition to your own statements in this Requestt you must ptrovide some other evidence of stalking, like police
reports, sworn statements from witnesses, aqdiottpes, photos, liters, etc.
Fore completQpefinition of talking, see Utah Code §§ 76-5-106.5 and 77~3a101- 103,
Provide as much information as you cap aflbut the Respondent. If you don't know, write "unknown.0
Respondent's Employer (Nome and address):
unemployed drug dealer
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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' i

Best place and tune to find the Respondent: riaak home Time:\jmknown
Other addresses (hangouts); one & only Bar fim House Bat\ piles lodge
'Describe Respondent's vehicle: Make: Chevy Mcjllcl : Blazer
Year: unkno Color: blue/green with tan stripe]down the bdnorn License Plate; unknown
Tf more than one vehicle, describe here: Make; fold Model::hxj)t
JBcjEdition
Year: unknown Color: Red with tan stripe do\m the bottom License Plate: i463dx
Has the Respondent used weapons or been violent;fin^ ie P ast ? Kj I Y e s 0 N o ^ D o n l t 1cT10W
Is the Respondent a law enforcement officer, goyercyjpent investigator,
or licensed private investigator?
QlYos S N o • Don't know
4

Describe the stalking below;

a.

When and where did the stalldng events hbpppfi? (Attach additional pages if necessary.)
I* stalking event:
When:
January 20 2009
Where:
Maverik 690 s river rd
"JlWl1,

stalldng event:
When:
March 11 2009
Where:
on the phone
b. Who did you report the stalldng to (if anypne)^
store director debbie tracy
c. List names of all people who witnessed the stq{Iking:
Katrina Barney, Chrystle Weeks, Paulfi, $erek Hymafy Vladimir Nominoff
d. List any evidence you have of the stalking
transcripts, audiotape, police reports, photos, sworn statements
a-at-least-one*
from witness (affidavits), etc. You must ana
Fpf-theseto-this form.
•tto
Police Report 03/30/09
Police Report 03/31/09
Written statement of witness Derek ffymtti

Roquost for Civil Stalking Injunction

04/01/09
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JB02213.txt|
St. Geor; 'police Dep|rartment
Offlffil q*|rs Reportj,

04/01/09
12:56
incident Number: 09P008328
Location:
A d d r : 258 s 2 0 0w
City: St George

Nature : Threatening

Alert codes:
Lst:
DOB:
Rac:
Cty:

case #:
Area:
contact:

St: U T zip-:!

Complainant:

QUINTERO
04/09/79 SSN:
L S X : F T e l : (435)229-3791}
St George
St: U T zip

I

4362
Page:
0902213

P3
Angelica
266505

F s t : ANGELICA
Mid: M
Adr: $58 S 200 W
wrk: i?435)628-1015
|[
81770

Offense Codes:

IT"

THRE
THREAT AGA'INS LIFE / WlO
STLK
STALKING
Circumstances:
BM88
NO Bias
WNONE
No weapon tor '(Force use
SUN
u s i n g : NOT} sijfpected
LT13
Highway/Rolacl
i
Respondinq Offi
cers:
Schafer,
J
antes:
\ ncy:
2X32 SGPfl
schafer,
Dames
j
Agte
Rspnsbl officer
Oldroyd,
icierst
J
u
jist
RadLodi; 09:54:51 03/31/09
CMPLT
Received By
P
IN PERSON j :1
clearance: RSP Reviewed Sgt Palmer
HOW Received
09:19:08 03/31/0J9 .
D i s p o s i t i o n : INA Disp Date: 03/31/09
when Reported
12:30:00 03/28/0J9 ;!
Dudici aF: Sts:
Occurrd between
13:30:00 03/28/09 :"
Misc Entry:
and
INVOLVEMENTS:
Date
Description
03/31/09
QUINJER0, ANGELICA M
03/31/09
QUINTERO, ANGELICA M
03/31/09
09:19:08 03/31/09 Threjatejlnng
Initial Contact
(UCA 63g.2-103(14)Ca)Cb))

Relationship
Complainant
VICTIM
I n i t i a t i n g Call

Responsible officer:D.schafer
P.O. Number :83 '
; "I
Incident/Case #:69P008328/O902213 : '•
Date/Time of Report:Tue Mar 31 09:j54;|f4 MDT 200$

INITIAL CONTACT:
On 3-31-09, O f c Schafer i
joncjkd to the 'lobby o f the Police Station on
threatening complaint. Angelica QuiH niixbro stated! jthat her ex boyfriend
threatened her on 3-28-09
schafer! I made contact with
denied the a l l e g a t i o n s . T|nslicase i s i p a c t i v e due to a lack of
evidence

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Page
Law Library,
1 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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e. Describe what the stalker did and why It i
being physically harmed, and why it wou]
being physically harmed:

f.

you or your mily member feel emotionally distressed or afraid of
/e made a mw pnable person feel emotionally distressed or afraid of

Jan 20 2O09.Parked outside my wori
who I talked to. Made me very ui

hours watifk w me thru the window watching what i did
Wortable. Mil like I wasnt safe.

March 28 2009. Walking to Walgree^
us and spoke very clearly saying
This made me feel like fleeing th\
really need help from the police
just trying to make trouble for Mi
seriously???

th my nepne \t\DereltHymas Mike Stevens pulled up behind
ilgonnagety if, You better watch yourself 11 will get you,"
\ntry I am U Vred to death of my life, my parents lives & I
time I've fled them, theyfofflcer Bdrton)told me I was
Vhatbitgk
iff to take? me being dead before you take this

Other facts:
1 know the reason this man wants m
Marijuana in Central. I did not snitc

mecL I beifk \e\he thinks I turned him in for

growing

I Mm.

Q Check here if you heed more space, Ask the cwkwr the "Desci Stalking"form. Fill it out and attach it to this form.

Other Court Cases
a. Are there other Court orders to the Respo|jJ deli about stallqr ;•> Q Yes B N o
(If Yes, fill out below and attach a copy qfth*en |/ vrd&rj
b. Have you or the Respondent ever been im|to Id in any otj icourt case involving either of you?
Q Yes E Ho (Jfyes, list ALL court cases\we. &
Did the judge make
Type of Case
County and State
Court
Mr on involved
(NOTBid
an order?
(NOT
report]

• f-- /•».*..:i t > i „ n , :

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
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P l e a s e , J u d g e , I a m asking y o u to:
El Make the orders I have checked below,
! »!

6 GEO Personal Conduct
Order the Respondent not to stalk me.

Is

7 H No Contact
Order the Respondent not to contact, pihprjqjjmail, email, <jj communicate with me in any way, either directly or
indirectly, or any person listed below;
Other people the Respondent must not ponti let;
Address
Relationship] to
Name
Petitioner |j
258 South 200 West #4 St.
LaNeta A. Quintero (67)
Mother
[George, UT 84770
258 South 200 West #4 St,
Robert ML Quintero (65)
Father
beorge UT 84770
i684 Buena vista
Fiance
JohnV. Cecil (31)
684 buena vista
nephew
Derek J. Hymas (23)
• I

;

8 I ] Stay Away
I; fi
Order the Respondent to stay away from: \ ]
E a. My current orfixture:13 Vehicle; GO Job • Schq&l E) Home, premises and property (My current
n
addresses are listed below):
Home address: 2S8 south 200 )\>m m St. GeorgbUT 84770
Work address: USDA Foresi\ $Mfice ForsythHe Trail Road
School address
Vehicle description: 76 blue gmc\j(\iclcup licensq.pB6872
13 b. Other (specify): 684 Buena Vuftri Washington VT 84780
•

9 •

Other Assistance Needed (List belay
listed on page J of this form):

•-.

!•

lather orders \jpeded to protect you and other protected people

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
4 OCR,
of 5 may contain errors.
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The Petitioner must read and sign belcpyv:

I swear that:
11 j
• t am the Petitioner and I have read (:his 'detition,
• I am a victim of stalking and belief tte Respondent I the stalker, and
• I live in this county
countv or the Respond)
Resoonduntl
or die stalking took place in this county.
R nt i tlives in this coil pty,
I
Date: ^l/ci/Of

signature:^

Petitio

i

I Hn must sign iklow,
If the Petitioner is a minor, then parent org

u

•*'"•

'

i
I swear that:
• I am Petitioner's parent or guardian
[1 have read thj$ petition,
• Petitioner is a victim of stalking andi I bs lieve the R e s i d e n t is the stalkci , and
^
• The petitioner lives in this county on t&jblRespondent \t& in this county, or the stalking took place in this
county.

Date:

Parent or guardian's sigmi I U T K ^ L
i jy
Print Parent or guardian'sjwji
I lL
rmitie

Clerk or Notary Public fills out belo\jv;is:
: j

• \i

Subscribed and sworn to before me on (a<Meh
I
i I
Clerk or Notary's Signature: L __

XIA^.VO-V>

County, Utah

pun

SIP 4

Mi
! !

! U:
;i i
I i

s

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 emporary Civil Stalkii

fWS^iCaseNumber; n q f t f i r t f r q q ' l

Ex Parte Order

| ; l ^ S i l 1 Court: Washington County Hall of Justice
^*$^?3fiF[.County:
^ ^ ^ • n . C c i u n t v : Washington State: Utah

iE>e_«*c KQ. " \

Petitioner (protected person):

Angelica Quintero
First

_

1

Othe,r people protected by this ord$j>
Middle

Last
Address and phone # (to keep private,leave b/an/cj,
258 South 200 West M
St George, Utah 84770
435-229-3791
435-652-3124 (Work)

Name

LaNfitaA. Quintero (67) ^therfyfa
Robert M. Quintero (65) F<^rJffi$/n
John V. Cecil (31) - fiance
\^CJ
* O
Derek J. Hymas (23) - nephew ^ ^ $ r ~ *
^0,0/,

Petitioner's attorney (If any):
Phone ti

Narua

Respondent (person Petitioner is protected from):

Sex ;
Male:: |
|
I

Mike Stevens
Pint

Describe Respondent:

Middle

Other names used: Ryder
Address;
3424 South River Road #G-6
Bloomington Hills, Utah 84790

Race ! Bate of Birth
White 01/16/1975
(Not
Hispanic

Eyes

h.— Hair

brown

brown

Social Security*
(only the last 4 numbers)
unkown

Distinguishing features (like scars, tattoos, limp, etc.):

recofting hairline
Drivers license issued by (State):
Expires: unkown
_ _
Bestltime and place to find Respondent: (TirnQ):unlcnOH>n
(Placp): home

Findings; The court has reviewed the Petitioner]&.. Request far..Stalking Injunction, finds there is reason to
believe it has jurisdiction over the parties and this c |^e, that stalling has occurred, and that the Respondent is the
stalker. The Respondent has the right to a hearing, if he or she aslj$ for it.
(Utah Code §77-$a-l06.S, §?7-$a-WL)
The coj

>rders the RespotTdsnt to obey all orders initialed on this form
You must not contact or stalk the Petitioner

This order ends 3 years
after it is served.

Warnings to the Respondent;
• Attention: This is an official court order. No one eitcept the couijt can change it, If you disobey this order, the court
may find you in contempt, You may also be arreted and prosecutedforthe crime of stalking and any other crime
you may)have committed in disobeying this order
• If you do not agree with this order, you can ask for p hearing to ttjtl your side. Your request must be in writing, and
of the date ypu were served with tliis order. If you do not ask
must be filed at the* court listed below within 10
for a hearing within 10 days, this order will last for3 years after it is served. You can still ask for a hearing after 10
days, but then you must persuade the court the injqfict ion KS not nL
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Court address to ask for a hearing: Washington Co,
ttnty Halt of justice, 220 North 200 East, Si George, Utah
84770
• This order is valid in all U.S. states and temtoricis, the Districtjof Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to
another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate& this order, a federal judge can send you to prison.
• No guns or firearms! It is a federal crime for you to have, poaaejjjs, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this stalking injunction is in effect,
Against Womer^Acfl of 1991 IB U.S.C §$2265, 2262,18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)
Vtahnpm

Obey all orders initialed by the judge.
Violation of these orders is a criminal Class AMisdcd[pea nor, punishable b
subsequent violation can result in more severe penalti BS.
l

sonal Conduct Order

Do not stalk the Petitioner. This iriesap]H you must nof follow, threaten, annoy, harass, or cause distress to
the Petitioner. For a legal definition o;f stalking, see Utah Code, sections 77-3a-l06.5 and 77-3a-101.
ntact Order
not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, ol• communicate in any way with the Petitioner and any person
listed below, either directly or indirectly
Other people you roust not contact: tyuNeta A. Qtihjtero (67), Robert M. Quintero (65), John V. Cecil
)
(31), Derek J. Hymas (23)
i

7^

Stay^Away Order
Stay away from:
ED a. The Petitioner's current or fuel[ire; El Vehicfe El Job Q School El Home, premises and
\s below): I.
property (list current addresms
Home address: 258 south 2m) west M StAQeorge (JT 84770
U Service Farsythe Trail Road
Work address: USDA Forftt
School address
Vehicle description: 76 blue feme pickup Ijpense #2B6872
El b. Other (specify): 684 Buena \ \ista, Washington UT 84780

Other Orders (List below):

Date:/

/}v)ir

Judge's Name:

0 ?

Time:/^

V L&WS

Tftmnrtrftfu Civil Stnlkinn Injunction

(

U
^'fyi

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Online Court Assistance Program

Judge *s Signature
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Disability Accommodations and Interpreter Services
Assistive listening systems, sign language and oral laifguagi;e interpreter services are available at no charge in stalking
proceedings. Contact the clerk's office at least 5 days JDefore your hearing.

I

WASHINGTON
his document i
correct cop

\

Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Approved by Bo3rd of District Court Judges, May 2006
3 of 3

